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The war, is approaching us.
The following speech took place in a SECURE BRIEFING
for the military leadership. It was not intended for public
dissemination.
In this speech a very high-ranking official in the Chinese Communist
Party calmly argues for the necessity of a nuclear war that will destroy
Japan and cripple the United States.
General Chi Haotian *China's Minister of Defense and vice-chairman
China’s Central Military Commission
Speech January 2003
Dear Comrades,
It is with a heavy heart that I use this title, but it is used because
China’s advancement into modernization has been continuously interrupted
due to attacks and direct invasions by external forces. The most typical
example is the so-called “Golden Decade” during 1927 to 1937. From
today’s perspective, this decade was not at all golden. During this
time, the Northeast region of China fell to enemy occupation on
September 18, 1931. The East Hebei Province puppet regime was also
established during that time. Comparatively speaking though, economic
growth was pretty fast; the construction of infrastructure made some
progress, and army development was also improved. China started to gain
a little bit of hope. But this was something that the Japanese could not
tolerate. They were not satisfied with the three Northeastern provinces
they occupied, wasting no time in launching a comprehensive invasion of
China, a nation compelled to fight the war painstakingly on scorched
earth for eight years. Although China won the war, she lost Outer
Mongolia and was vitally wounded. The property loss was more than 600
billion US dollars. After eight years of war, the original poor and weak
China was in worse economic shape than ever. In other words, Japan’s
invasion, especially its comprehensive war on China, greatly slowed down
China’s modernization.
Disallowing China’s development and hindering the advance towards
modernization had always been the luxury of those countries in power,
especially considering Japan’s unchangeable national policy. We have
suffered the most painful history lessons regarding this. There is often
cooperation between counties, but the most fundamental basis for the
relationship between countries is competition, conflict and at times
extreme conflicts; that is, war. Cooperation is temporary and
conditional, while competition and conflicts are absolute. They are the
true subject of history. That’s why the so-called peace and development
spoken of today is incorrect (at best it is simply an expedient
measure). In saying this there is no concrete supporting evidence for
this statement, and neither does it conform to any factual or historical
experiences. Not to mention that China and Japan are sworn enemies both
geographically and historically, with even the split between China and
the Soviet Union in the 1960s providing evidence to show that any
country regards the pursuit of its own national interest as its only
criterion for action. No country leaves any space for morality. Over the
past, China and the Soviet Union shared the same ideology and faced the
same enemies, and China’s low levels of science and technology were not
adequate to pose a threat to the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, China and
the Soviet Union were split and intensely battled with each other. There
may be many reasons contributing to this, but one fundamental reason is
that the Soviet Union did not want to see an ever-growing, stronger
China existing alongside it. Even though China was only beginning to
grow, and would require a long time to reach a condition of strength,
the Soviet Union still could not tolerate it.
If China and the Soviet Union, both a weak and a strong country sharing
the same ideology and common enemies, could split up, then it is more
than obvious that the incantations about “peace and development being
today’s main focus,” which lead China’s political, military and foreign
strategies, is a hallucination—fragile and dangerous.
My statement that peace and development as today’s main focus is
completely incorrect, one-sided and a harmful theory that benumbs people
flows from the following reasons.
ONE: Attacking China’s Modernization Has Always Been a National Policy
for the Great Powers
We can obtain an historical rule from the experiences and lessons of
China’s modern history, as well as from those of the 50 year history of
the People’s Republic of China: Attacking China’s modernization
(including launching a comprehensive war) has always been a national
policy for the great powers. For the past 160 years it’s been this way.
For the future 160 years, it will still remain this way.
TWO: Development Attracts Danger and Threats; Without the “Right to War”
There is No Right to Develop
Development invites danger and threats, and this has been the general
rule throughout world history. There were only several exceptions in
Chinese history. For example, the Han Dynasty could start to develop
with the “door closed” after it had defeated all the other competitors
within the geographic limits at that time. It then developed the
ideology of “world harmony.” Because it was not a matter involving the
populace, the military, the economy or culture, there were no
competitors, and no other races could compete with the Han race or even
have the potential for competition. During the Warring States era
(403-222 CE) in ancient Chinese history, one country’s development meant
a threat to another country, and this was the universal rule in world
history. It is also the core and foundation of western diplomacy, the
father of which was the French cardinal Richelieu, being the first
person in the field of western diplomacy to walk out of medieval
“ignorance.” He began the tradition of modern diplomacy, which is fully
oriented around national interests, discarding all moral and religious
restrictions. The diplomacy policy set by Cardinal Richelieu benefited
France for over two hundreds years, making possible the domination of
Europe. Richelieu planned the 30-years’ war that caused so much
suffering to Germany, and divided it into small feudal regions. This
chaos remained until Bismarck reunited Germany. This process of German
reunion demonstrates the above rule, as without Bismarck’s “right to
war,” there would have been no national reunion; not to mention the
right to develop.
THREE: Modernization Under the Saber: China’s Only Choice
The concept of a “China Threat” is definitely correct, and this is a
fairly typical western thought. The Chinese-type thought of, “I close my
door to develop my own economy—does this bother anyone?” is not just
foolish, but also does not match up with “international common
practice.” During the Warring States era there was no room for
gentleness and softness in the harsh field of national interests—whoever
had the slightest fantasy would be cruelly punished by history. The
development of China is definitely a threat to countries like Japan and
others. China may not view it in this way itself, but it is impossible
for China to change this kind of deep-seated, international common view
held by the big powers, which include Japan. So the base point for our
thoughts should be and must be, “The development of China is a threat to
countries like Japan.”
By “right” it is meant that every nation and race should have its living
rights and its development rights. For example, China needs to import
oil for its economic development, and to import raw materials such as
lumber, in order to protect its environment from deforestation. This is
very reasonable. But big powers have their own “reasons,” and a country
like China will need to consume 100 million tons of oil in 2010, and 200
million tons in 2020. Will these big powers tolerate this?
The source of the majority of wars throughout history has been the
struggle for basic living resources (including land and ocean). The
subject of the conflict will change in the current information era, but
the nature of it will remain the same. Developed, advanced civilizations
like Israel have fought for over 50 years and are now still fighting
with the Palestinians for insignificant areas of land (including the
fight for water resources). In order to fight for our very reasonable
development rights (unless Chinese are satisfied with the current
poverty, and are prepared to give up the right of development), China
needs to be prepared for war. This is not decided by us; not by the
goodwill of kind people among us, but actually, this is decided by
“international common practice,” and the big powers around the world.
The twenty years’ policy of peaceful development has reached its end.
The international environment has undergone a fundamental change; the
big powers have already planned to once again stop China’s progress
towards modernization, so China needs to develop, needs to protect its
own right to development; and therefore China needs to be prepared for
war. Only by being prepared for war can China win space and time for her
further development.
Twenty years of pastoral-style development has come to its end; the next
program should be and must be, “modernization under the saber.”
FOUR: Diplomacy Determines Internal Affairs
At the present time in China, even the most hawkish of hawkish persons
would not necessarily advocate war, although we have sufficient reason
to do so; for instance, for the unification of the country and the
maintenance of rights in the South China Sea. It would be for the right
to development, which is extremely cherished since the Chinese have
rarely enjoyed it in the past 160 years. But, when this right to
development is threatened more and more over time, it is time for us to
pick up arms to guard this national right.
It is fitting that internal affairs determines diplomacy, but do not
forget that in this Warring States era, diplomacy among major nations
also determines internal affairs. This is not just a theoretical
viewpoint, it has been an historical experience of the People's Republic
of China. In the 1970s China's defense spending surpassed expenditure
for science, education, culture, and health added together (causing
Chinese people to live in poverty). I certainly don’t want the same
today; in fact, what is needed the most in China is investment in
education. But would the world powers permit it? Wouldn’t one wish to
invest more in science, education, culture, and health?
Some have said that, according to the so-called deciphered Soviet
documents, it was shown that the Soviet Union did not have comprehensive
plans to invade China. Even if the deciphering of these documents was
correct, this still cannot explain the reality of that piece of history.
Just as a chess game is mutually interactive, because China made
sufficient spiritual and material preparations under the leadership of
CCP, it enormously increased the risk and cost for the Soviet Union to
invade China. It caused history to completely turn in another direction.
The weak figure can only attract aggression. Those who view this from
this angle are the true defenders of peace.
FIFTH: Evil as Result of Begging for Goodness: is There Peace for China
in the Coming 10 Years?
In order to interrupt the advancement of modernization in China, to
deprive Chinese people of the right to development, the world powers
have many cards to play. The most obvious three cards are the "three
islands," with the most effective one being Taiwan. If war in the Taiwan
Straits erupted, the power to make decisions would not be in our hands,
nor in the hands of those who advocate Taiwanese independence, but in
the hands of the United States and Japan. If such a war erupted, it
would not be simply a war of unification, as the deeper implication is
that the United States and Japan are determined to deprive China of its
right to development. This will once again interrupt the modernization
process in China. Just like in the historical Sino-Japanese War of
1894-1895, where Japan comprehensively invaded China, Japan not only
made China cede territory and pay indemnities, but in essence
interrupted Chinese modernization, while also depriving the Chinese of
civil rights.
Therefore, we must look at a Taiwan Straits war on the level of a
strategic decisive battle. But based on our present military force, it
is out of the question to talk about this aspect from the viewpoints of
the United States and Japan, especially that of the United States,
because China only has a few intercontinental missiles, and the United
States is fully determined to develop National Missile Defense (NMD).
To prevent delaying the eruption of the Taiwan Straits war, this war
would first have to be elevated to the level of "a symmetrical strategic
decisive battle" using the formula of “fish dead net broken.” If we
failed to win the Taiwan Straits war, the results would be worse than
those following the Sino-Japanese War. Therefore, there must be no war,
or we will have to comprehensively destroy Japan and cripple the United
States, and this could only be achieved with a nuclear war.
Evil as a result of begging for goodness—this would signal the final end
of our present policy. Goodness as a result of asking for evil—only with
the power that is capable of totally extinguishing Japan and crippling
the United States can we win peace; otherwise the Taiwan problem cannot
be prolonged for more than 10 years, and there will be war within 10
years!
SIXTH: Hegemony is the Characteristic Signifying the Existence of a
World Power
What is a world power? A nation employing hegemony is a world power! One
would be slaughtered by others at will, and one’s destiny (including the
right to development) would be controlled by others, much as a puppet is
controlled. The hegemony in this Warring States era is an objective
fact; it "is not to be diverted by human will." The question is, whether
you realize it or not; whether it is active pursuit or a passive act.
All problems in China, including the three islands problem; the
strategic industry development problem; the benefit adjustment of the
domestic various social classes problem—in the end are all problems
involving the fight for Chinese hegemony.
To have hegemony we cannot have continued internal struggle; we must
have internal stability and unity. England, as an example, was able to
realize "changing the working class to nobility" long ago because of the
huge benefits from overseas colonies. The enormous indemnity that Japan
extracted from China not only benefited the Japanese upper levels, but
also greatly benefited their lower levels. Times have changed, and
national sentiment is different, but the essence is the same. Not only
must we look at the military and diplomacy from the point of hegemony,
but we must particularly regard the internal stratum and adjustment
problems of class interests from the angle of hegemony. Those
upper-level people who squeeze and exploit our country’s lower-level
people can not represent the national welfare in this Warring States
era. They are decadent, degenerated, unpromising, and should be
restricted and eliminated. Only mature and wise upper levels can
represent the national welfare in the implementation of "the concession
policy" and the lower level leaders jointly, to catch overseas benefits
(this problem is more complex, and will be discussed in detail later.
China has enormous opportunities for benefits overseas; it is just that
we have not yet actively exploited them.)
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*“The War Is Approaching Us” was first posted on the Internet in January
2003 with title “A recent speech from a high ranking official in PLA” on
web sites such as www.mwjx.com. On October 11, it was published on
www.chinaren.com with the title “The War Is Approaching Us—Chi Haotian.”
It was also posted with title “China, do you still have ten years’ peace
time?” It was most recently published on April 23, 2005 on www.boxun.com.
At the time this speech was first published, Chi Haotian was China’s
Defense Minister and Vice-chair of the Central Military Commission.
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* General Chi, born in July, 1929; native of Zhaoyuan, Shandong
Province; joined army in July, 1945; joined Communist Party of China
(CPC) in October, 1946.
Chi started from a copy clerk, signalman and squad leader in his teens,
and rose to serve as company and battalion officers in Third Field Army
before New China was founded in 1949, participating in a number of major
campaigns.
From 1950-1955, served as battalion instructor and director of a
regimental political department of the Chinese People's Volunteers.
Studied at Infantry School of People's Liberation Army (PLA) and
Combination Department of PLA Military College From 1958-1960.
Served then as reginmental political department director, regimental
political commissar, division political department director and division
political commissar in 27th Corps in late 1960s and early 1970s.
Also served as leading official in Liberation Army Daily, deputy
editor-in-chief of the People's Daily and deputy political commissar of
Beijing Military Area Command in 1970s.
Between 1977-1992, Chi worked as deputy chief of the PLA General Staff,
political commissar of Jinan Military Area Command, member of Central
Military Commission and chief of PLA General Staff.
He served as member of Central Military Commission, state councilor and
minister of national defense, 1992-1995.
Since 1995, he been serving as vice-chairman of Central Military
Commission, state councilor and minister of national defense.
He was member of 12th, 13th and 14th CPC Central Committees, and a
member of Political Bureau of 15th CPC Central Committee. Mr. Chi was
also state councilor in cabinet led by Zhu Rongi.
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1936 Graduated, Anti-Japanese Military and Political College
1945 Joined, PLA
1946 Joined, CPC
Graduated, Nanjing Military Academy, Jiangsu Province, Nanjing City
Graduated, Political Academy of the Chinese PLA
1946—1949 Company Instructor, PLA, Services and Arms, Field Army
Participated, Shanghai Campaign (Commended as First-Class Combat Model)
(Entitled, Third-Class People's Hero of East China)
1951 Joined, Korean War, Chinese People's Volunteers
1951—???? Battalion Instructor, Korean War, PLA, Regimental Political
Department
1951—???? Deputy Director, Korean War, PLA, Regimental Political
Department
Student, PLA High Infantry School
Student, Military Academy of the Chinese PLA, Combination Department
Regimental Political Commissar, PLA, Beijing Military Region
Division Director, PLA, Beijing Military Region, Political Department
Deputy Political Commissar, PLA, Beijing Military Region
Deputy Chief, PLA, Headquarters of the General Staff
Political Commissar, PLA, Jinan Military Region
1967—1972 Delegate, 9th CPC, National Congress
1970—???? Leader, Liberation Army Daily
1970—???? Deputy Editor-in-Chief, People's Daily
1977—1982 Delegate, 11th CPC, National Congress
1982—1987 Member, 12th CPC, Central Committee
1987—1992 Chief, PLA, Headquarters of the General Staff
1987—1992 Member, 13th CPC, Central Committee
1992—1997 Member, 14th CPC, Central Committee
1992—1997 Member, Central Military Commission of the PRC
1992—1997 Vice-Chairman, 14th CPC, Central Committee, Central Military
Commission
1993— Member, State Council
1993—1998 Minister, (National Defense, 1st Session, 8th NPC)
1995— Present Vice-Chairman, Central Military Commission of the PRC
1997—2002 Member, 15th CPC, Central Committee
1997—2002 Member, 15th CPC, Central Committee, Politboro
1998—2003 Minister, Ministry of National Defense
1999 Member, Macao SAR Preparatory Committee, Government Delegation,
Macao Hand-Over Ceremony
Source: La Nueva
Cuba
October 6, 2005
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