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Documents
Report from Commission for
Assistance to a Free Cuba.
Report to the president
June 2006
CONDOLEEZZA RICE
SECRETARY OF STATE
CHAIR
CARLOS GUTIERREZ
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
CO-CHAIR
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY……………………………………………….... 5
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………… 11
CHAPTER 1: HASTENING THE END OF THE CASTRO DICTATORSHIP:
TRANSITION NOT SUCCESSION
I. Introduction……………………………………………………….... 14
II. Determinations …………………………………………………..… 16
III. Empowering the Cuban People…………………………………..… 17
IV. Breaking the Regime’s Information Blockade……………………... 21
V. Undermining the Regime’s Succession Strategy…………………... 22
VI. Denying Revenue to the Castro Regime………………………….... 29
CHAPTER 2: HELPING CUBANS RESPOND TO CRITICAL
HUMANITARIAN AND SOCIAL NEEDS
I. Introduction………………………………………………………… 34
II. Water and Sanitation……………………………………………….. 36
III. Health-Care and Nutrition …………………………………………. 38
IV. Food Security ……………………………………………………… 42
V. Shelter …………………………………………………………….. 46
VI. Protection of the Most Vulnerable Populations………………….… 48
VII. Educational Systems……………………………………………..… 49
CHAPTER 3: HELPING CUBANS GET TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS
I. Introduction………………………………………………………… 52
II. Release of Political Prisoners………………………………………. 53
III. Eliminating Legal Obstacles to Freedom of Speech, Freedom of the
Press and Freedom
of Political Association………………………... 55
IV. Preparing For Competitive Multi-Party Elections And Democratic
Process……………………………………………………………... 55
V. Support a Free and Independent Media……………………………..56
VI. Support For Free And Fair Election Administration………………. 57
VII. Support For Professional, Institutional Military…………………… 60
CHAPTER 4: HELPING CUBANS CREATE MARKET-BASED ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITIES
I. Introduction………………………………………………………… 61
II. Macroeconomic Stability…………………………………………... 62
III. Integration with the International Trade and Financial System……. 64
IV. Encourage Small Business Development………………………….. 66
V. Ensuring Labor Rights are Respected……………………………… 67
VI. Property Rights and Confiscated Property…………………………. 68
VII. Agriculture…………………………………………………………. 69
VIII. Infrastructure……………………………………………………….. 70
IX. Issues for a Free Cuba……………………………………………… 75
CHAPTER 5: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
I. Engaging the International Community in Helping Cubans Respond to
Critical
Humanitarian and Social Needs…………………………… 77
II. Engaging the International Community in Helping Cubans Get to Free
and Fair
Elections…………………………………………………... 79
III. Engaging the International Community in Helping Cubans Create
Market-Based
Economic Opportunities……………………………. 80
CHAPTER 6: THE VITAL ROLE OF CUBANS ABROAD
I. Helping Cubans Respond to Humanitarian and Social Needs........... 83
II. Helping Cubans Get to Free and Fair Elections……………………. 84
III. Helping Cubans Create Market-Based Economic Opportunities….. 85
CHAPTER 7: PREPARING NOW TO SUPPORT THE TRANSITION
I. Essential Steps to Take Now……………………………………….. 88
II. Steps to Take Now to Prepare to Help Cubans Respond to Critical
Humanitarian and
Social Needs……………………………………. 89
III. Steps to Take Now to Prepare to Help Cubans Get to Free and Fair
Elections……………………………………………………………. 91
IV. Steps to Take Now to Prepare to Help Cubans Create Market-Based
Economic
Opportunities…………………………………………… 93
V. Additional Recommended Action………………………………….. 93
HASTENING CHANGE IN CUBA: TRANSITION, NOT SUCCESSION
Since the publication of the 2004 Commission for Assistance to a Free
Cuba
(CAFC) report, there have been important changes both on and off the
island that the
Commission has weighed in making this new set of recommendations. Today,
we see in Cuba a more active civil society, one energized by a growing
sense of what is possible. At the same time, there are clear signs the
regime is using money provided by the Chavez government in Venezuela to
reactivate its networks in the hemisphere to subvert democratic
governments. The Castro regime’s international meddling is done at the
expense of the needs of the Cuban people. There is a growing sense of
frustration among ordinary Cubans with a dictatorship that asks them to
sacrifice, but expends considerable resources in the far flung reaches
of the hemisphere and beyond.
Cubans continue to be imprisoned for activities that Americans take for
granted
each and every day: reading and viewing what they wish; accessing
information from the outside world, including the Internet; meeting in
their homes to discuss the future of their country; running a lending
library; or conducting petition drives. Despite the savage campaign
against them by the regime, the Cuban people are losing their fear and
continue to risk life, limb, livelihood, and imprisonment in search of a
better future for their families and their nation.
The Commission’s recommendations to hasten democratic change in Cuba
reflect
recognition of the leadership and bravery of the Cuban people. They also
reflect the
Commission’s view that the United States and other friends of democracy
should
acknowledge and honor the courage of Cuban democracy activists by
supporting their
efforts to recapture their sovereignty for their fellow Cubans.
Yet at the same time that we see hope and growth in Cuban civil society,
Fidel Castro and his inner circle have begun a gradual but intrinsically
unstable process of succession. The regime is unquestionably attempting
to insulate itself from the consequences of Fidel Castro’s
incapacitation, death, or ouster. The regime continues to harden its
edges and is feverishly working to forestall any opportunity for a
genuine
democratic transition on the island.
The current regime in Havana is working with like-minded governments,
particularly Venezuela, to build a network of political and financial
support designed to forestall any external pressure to change. This
state of affairs highlights the urgency of working today to ensure that
the Cuban transition is genuine and that the Castro regime’s succession
strategy does not succeed.
It is against this back-drop that the Commission for Assistance to a
Free Cuba again assembles and looks at the question of how to help the
Cuban people hasten and ensure a genuine democratic transition on the
island. This is a time for bold, decisive action and clarity of message.
Recommendations to hasten the end of the Castro dictatorship include:
measures to empower the Cuban people to prepare for change by
strengthening support to civil society; breaking the regime’s
information blockade; a diplomatic strategy to undermine the regime’s
succession strategy by supporting the Cuban people’s right to determine
their future; and measures to deny revenue to the Castro regime that is
used to strengthen its repressive security apparatus and to bolster the
regime against pressure for change.
HELPING CUBANS RESPOND TO CRITICAL HUMANITARIAN AND SOCIAL NEEDS
The Castro regime is failing to address even the most basic humanitarian
needs of the Cuban people. Chronic malnutrition, polluted drinking
water, and untreated chronic diseases continue to affect a significant
percentage of the Cuban people. Conditions will not improve as long as
Fidel Castro remains in power.
With the end of the Castro regime, however, the Cuban Transition
Government will
face daunting challenges as it begins to address the basic human needs
of the Cuban people. The Cuban people will expect rapid and effective
action by this new government. The U.S. Government stands ready to help
the Cuban Transition Government begin to address the immediate water,
sanitation, health, food, shelter and education needs of the Cuban
people. Helping the Cuban Transition Government meet these basic needs
is essential to a rapid and successful transition period, the
establishment of the new government’s credibility, and timely democratic
elections.
By providing assistance in these areas, the U.S. Government can help the
Cuban
Transition Government guarantee political freedom, economic opportunity,
and hold free and fair multiparty elections.
HELPING CUBANS GET TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS
Cubans have the right to see their sovereign will expressed through free
and fair,
multiparty elections. The transition to an open environment, free of
intimidation and other impediments, and sufficiently in advance of
elections to meet international standards, implies that a Cuban
Transition Government will need certain types of assistance from the
international community. The United States should be prepared to
respond. U.S. preparations should be structured to provide assistance
bilaterally but should also focus on building an international consensus
for assistance focused around supporting the process of rebuilding
democracy in Cuba.
A Cuban Transition Government cannot be expected to rectify, in a few
months, the
consequences of decades of dictatorship. Accordingly, the U.S. should
encourage the
Cuban Transition Government to focus on those steps that will allow the
election of a truly democratic, representative government that can take
on that historic challenge.
The principal purpose of any U.S. assistance should be to help Cubans
create a stable, open environment where free and fair elections can take
place. U.S. assistance should be offered to help Cubans overcome
obstacles to democratic elections and move rapidly to create an
environment conducive to free and fair
multiparty elections.
If requested by a new Cuban government, U.S. assistance could be made
available to help in the release of political prisoners; eliminating
obstacles to free speech, a free press, and freedom of association;
preparing for competitive multi-party elections; in
establishing a free and fair election administration; and in preparing
the Cuban military forces to adjust to an appropriate role in a
democracy.
HELPING CUBANS CREATE
MARKET-BASED ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES
The economic potential of the Cuban people has for too long been
suppressed, held
hostage to a failed economic model that sustains the regime but does
nothing to bring
prosperity to the people of Cuba. A Cuban Transition Government will
face significant
pressure to take quick action to increase economic opportunities and
give the Cuban people hope for an economic stake in the new system.
Quick and visible economic progress will give important legitimacy to
the Cuban Transition Government.
A Cuban Transition Government will face critical issues ranging from
stabilizing
the Cuban macroeconomic condition to creating a microeconomic framework
that will
allow private enterprise to grow. It will confront a long history of
poor labor relations and
demands to respect the rights of workers to form unions and bargain
collectively. It will
need to ensure that its critical infrastructure is not only adequately
functioning, but on the road to recovery and keeping pace with the
demands of a growing, free economy.
In addition, other actors, including Cubans abroad, the international
community,
and the U.S. Government, will have an important role to play in
responding to requests
from the Cuban Transition Government for support and advice. We need to
prepare now
to maximize the benefit each of these actors can bring to the table at a
key moment in
Cuban history.
Should a Cuban Transition Government request United States assistance in
its
economic transition, the U.S. Government can provide help in
establishing macroeconomic stability; reintegrating Cuba to the
international trade and financial systems; encouraging small business
development; ensuring labor rights are respected; stabilizing existing
Cuban agricultural capability and local markets; and improving
broad-based access to and accountability for sustainable essential
infrastructure.
THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
The international community will be instrumental in assisting a Cuban
Transition
Government that guarantees political freedom, economic opportunity and
holds free and fair elections. Support from the international community
will also help accelerate Cuba’s reintegration into the world economy,
bring useful experiences to bear from other countries that have
succeeded in transitions, and ease the humanitarian and financial burden
on the Cuban Transition Government. The United States and its neighbors
have committed to representative democracy as the standard for the
Inter-American system and have an obligation under the Inter-American
Democratic Charter to support and defend democracy and all that it
represents. These commitments will guide our approach to a transitional
Cuba.
If the Cuban Transition Government requests help, the U.S. Government
will work
with international organizations, bilateral donors and internationall
and assistance
organizations to ensure coordinated and complimentary assistance in
helping Cubans create market-based economic opportunities; respond to
critical humanitarian and social needs; conduct free and fair elections;
and, in helping prepare Cuba’s military forces to adjust to an
appropriate role in a democracy.
THE VITAL ROLE OF CUBANS ABROAD
As part of a broader effort by the international community, Cubans
around the
world can play a crucial role in providing assistance in all of the
areas covered by this
report to secure the success of the transition to a Free Cuba. Cubans
living abroad can provide much needed resources in the form of
information, research and know- how, as well as material support,
remittances, loans and investment capital. Reconciling and reuniting the
Cuban family in freedom will also be essential to the successful, rapid
return of sovereignty to the Cuban people.
The Commission strongly believes that the Cuban community abroad should
re-double their efforts to foster reconciliation on and off the island
and to undertake steps now to organize and prepare to assist a
Transition Government in Cuba. In addition, the U.S.
Government should work with the Cuban community to ensure that their
support to the transition, and the planning for it, is coordinated in a
way that is consistent with overall reconstruction efforts.
PREPARING NOW TO SUPPORT THE TRANSITION
With this report, the Commission continues an ongoing planning and
coordination
process to hasten democracy in Cuba and institutionalizes ongoing
planning to support, if requested, a Cuban Transition Government that
guarantees political freedom, economic opportunity, and holds free and
fair multiparty elections.
This is an ongoing process to accompany Cubans in their transition to
freedom. We
will need to update and adapt our preparations to keep pace with Cubans
themselves. This will ensure that, when asked, we will be able to offer
appropriate support that meets needs identified by Cubans.
The U.S. Government will need to be prepared well in advance to help in
the event
assistance is requested by the Cuban Transition Government. U.S.
preparations should be structured so that assistance can be offered
immediately to the Cuban Transition Government bilaterally as necessary
and then folded into a broader international effort as that develops.
In establishing a strong foundation on which to build, the first six
months of any
requested U.S. assistance program is of paramount importance. This
critical 180-day
period could mean the difference between a successful transition and the
stumbles and missteps that slowed other states as they moved toward
democracy.
In addition to the steps recommended by the Commission to help hasten
the
transition, several steps can be taken to ensure broad-based involvement
of the U.S.
Government, international partners and organizations, as well as our own
civil society and private sector. The Commission makes a number of
practical recommendations that the United States can implement today in
preparation for the inevitable transition. These include the areas of
government organization; electoral preparation; and anticipating
critical humanitarian and social needs.
INTRODUCTION
This second report to the President from the Commission for Assistance
to a Free
Cuba continues and builds upon the recommendations implemented through
the
Commission’s first report submitted in May 2004. This report contains
seven chapters and a series of recommendations, consistent with U.S.
law, designed to help Cubans secure real and lasting change in their
country. It recommends that the United States be prepared to offer
prioritized assistance to a Cuban transition government that moves
rapidly to free and fair, multiparty elections.
This report broadly summarizes resources and expertise the U.S.
Government could
make available, in accordance with U.S. law, should a Cuban Transition
Government
committed to free and fair elections ask for our help. This report seeks
to unify U.S.
Government efforts under a strategic goal to help manage and coordinate
ongoing efforts to plan for Cuba’s transition. It also recognizes that
the international community and Cubans abroad will have an important
role to play in Cuba’s transition. This document represents the work of
over 100 participants from seventeen federal departments and agencies
over the course of several months.
As long as the regime abuses the people of Cuba our policy will remain
firm. Implementing the Commission’s recommendations for hastening a
transition has helped break the regime’s information blockade on Cubans
and is denying resources that the regime would otherwise use to repress
its citizens. This report’s recommendations for helping hasten the
transition are centered on a substantial increase in our efforts, in
concert with other nations, to empower Cubans to define a democratic
future for their country.
In keeping with the first Commission report, this document sets forth
specific
assistance and programs the United States can offer to help Cubans
quickly recover their sovereignty through free and fair multiparty
elections. This report was developed on the basis of U.S. law and we
recommend that implementation be done with due regard for international
law and treaty obligations, internationally recognized human rights, and
democratic principles. It reflects the commitment we and the other
nations of the Western Hemisphere made in the Inter-American Democratic
Charter to the promotion and defense of democracy.
The prospective recommendations and proposals in this report are not
prescriptions or dictates. They only become possible when the President
determines that there is a transition government in place and they only
remain possible if that government continues to work toward free and
fair multiparty elections. In implementing this assistance, we will need
to ensure that we are reinforcing a process of democratic change and not
reinforcing anti-democratic regime elements.
The existence of the Commission and the recommendations in this report
provide a
formal process within the United States government to support the
freedom movement in Cuba today and to take actions now to develop
appropriate plans to support a democratic transition tomorrow. The U.S.
Government, at the highest levels, is engaged in this effort.
This is an ongoing process to accompany Cubans in their transition to
freedom. We
will need to update and adapt our preparations to keep pace with Cubans
themselves. This will ensure that, when asked, we will be able to offer
appropriate support that meets needs identified by Cubans.
The American people understand and support the aspirations of people all
over the
world, including Cubans, to live in freedom. Americans have not only
opened their hearts but also our shores to the Cuban people. We are
confident that a free and prosperous Cuba will once again be a friend to
the United States.
The Cuban dictatorship remains a danger, especially to its own people,
even in its
twilight. It still seeks to frustrate democratic governance in the
region and to actively
undermine United States interests. Cubans endure the grim reality of
life in their country.
Living under a dictatorship means a daily struggle to satisfy needs and
wants, with
immorality, and, above all, with hopelessness. Cubans need to know there
is hope in freedom. Accordingly, we cannot falter or fail to support the
Cuban people as they approach the opportunity for real change.
When the time comes, the generosity Americans have always extended to
Cubans will surely be redoubled.
With the horizon marking the end of the long struggle against tyranny in
Cuba approaching, the Commission’s fundamental premise is that Cubans
themselves will define their own destiny. Only Cubans can chart a path
to liberty, prosperity, and
reconciliation. It is they who will ensure that the dictatorship which
advocated nuclear war against our nation will rapidly come to an end.
Cubans in Cuba, at great personal risk, are already talking about a
democratic transition for their country. It is what Cubans say about the
future of Cuba that truly matters. The civic opposition movement is
creating momentum for democratic change in Cuba. With our offer of
support, advice, and help to all who seek democratic change in Cuba, we
hope to add to this momentum and to keep pace with the Cuban people as
they press for democratic change.
Continued dictatorship will result in neither stability nor opportunity
in Cuba. The world’s democracies can work together now to support the
right of Cubans to define a democratic future for their country. Just as
Cubans will face an inevitable opportunity for change, the international
community will face a choice. Half measures and partial reforms by an
unelected successor regime short of free and fair elections should not
be rewarded with recognition or support from the free nations of the
world.
As a community of free nations, we can intensify our efforts now to help
Cubans who
support liberty, prosperity, and reconciliation. We hope this report
will find resonance with the people of Cuba, the world’s democracies,
and the people of the United States.
Together, we can reassure the Cuban people that they can count on
democratic allies as they move to see their sovereign will expressed
through free and fair, multiparty elections.
CHAPTER 1
HASTENING THE END
OF THE CASTRO DICTATORSHIP:
TRANSITION NOT SUCCESSION
This is an unclassified report. For reasons of national security and
effective
implementation, some recommendations are contained in a separate
classified annex.
INTRODUCTION
Three years ago, the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba began the
most
significant review of U.S. policy toward Cuba in decades, developing a
specific set of
recommendations focused on hastening a democratic transition in Cuba.
The 2004 CAFC report identified the “survival strategies” of the Castro
regime and its cynical manipulation of United States humanitarian
policies and examined its relentless pursuit of hard currency to
maintain its repression of the Cuban people and their aspirations for
freedom.
Recommendations designed to limit the regime’s access to hard currency
were
implemented and have subsequently helped to restrict the funds available
to the regime to sustain itself in power.
The 2004 report made the case for offering more direct U.S. support to
Cubans on
the island who advocate real change and for breaking down the
information blockade
erected by the regime across the island. The Commission has re-affirmed
the direction
taken in the 2004 report as a solid foundation upon which to make
additional
recommendations designed to hasten and consolidate a democratic
transition in Cuba.
Since the publication of the 2004 report, there have been important
changes both on
and off the island that the Commission has weighed in making this new
set of
recommendations. Today, we see in Cuba a more active civil society, one
energized by a growing sense of what is possible.
At the same time, there are clear signs the regime is using money
provided by the Chavez government in Venezuela to reactivate its
networks in the hemisphere to subvert democratic governments. The Castro
regime’s international meddling is done at the expense of the needs of
the Cuban people. There is a growing sense of frustration among ordinary
Cubans with a dictatorship that asks them to sacrifice, but expends
considerable resources in the far flung reaches of the hemisphere and
beyond.
Cubans continue to be imprisoned for activities that Americans take for
granted
each and every day: reading and viewing what they wish; accessing
information from the outside world, including the Internet; meeting in
their homes to discuss the future of their country; running a lending
library; or conducting petition drives. Despite the savage campaign
against them by the regime, the Cuban people are losing their fear and
continue to risk life, limb, livelihood, and physical freedom in search
of a better future for their nation.
The Commission’s recommendations reflect recognition of the leadership
and
bravery of the Cuban people. They also reflect the Commission’s view
that the United
States and other friends of democracy should acknowledge and honor the
courage of Cuban democracy activists by supporting them as they work to
secure the rapid return of sovereignty to the people of their nation.
Yet, at the same time that we see hope and growth in Cuban civil
society, we also know that Fidel Castro and his inner circle are engaged
in an effort to ensure a succession within the revolution. The regime is
attempting to insulate itself from the consequences of Fidel Castro’s
incapacitation, death, or ouster. The regime continues
to harden its edges and is feverishly working to forestall any
opportunity for a genuine democratic transition on the island by putting
hardliners into key positions and rolling back even minimal economic
openings. And, as noted above, the repressive instruments of the regime
are working assiduously to stamp out civil society
initiatives, but without success.
The current regime in Havana is working with like-minded governments,
particularly Venezuela, to build a network of political and financial
support designed to
forestall any external pressure to change. This state of affairs
highlights the urgency of
working today to ensure that the Cuban transition is genuine and that
the Castro regime’s succession strategy does not succeed.
It is against this back-drop that the Commission for Assistance to a
Free Cuba again
assembles and looks at the question of how to help the Cuban people
hasten and ensure a genuine transition on the island. This is a time for
bold, decisive action and clarity of message.
DETERMINATIONS
• In order to lead genuine change, the Cuban people must have hope for a
better future
in a Free Cuba.
• Our goal is to support the growing consensus for democracy in Cuba
itself. A
perpetuation of the status quo in Cuba through a succession among the
current
ruling elites would be a tragedy for the Cuban people. They have endured
decades
of dictatorship and deserve to regain their sovereignty and chart a new
course for
their country.
• It is the Cuban people on the island who will chart the course of
their future. They are
increasingly active and brave in the face of the regime’s brutality;
they deserve U.S.
and international support, both through creative, well-funded programs
designed to
empower them, and through diplomatic efforts to help build an
international
consensus around action to promote a genuine democratic transition in
Cuba.
• The greatest guarantor of genuine stability in Cuba is the rapid
restoration of
sovereignty to the Cuban people through free and fair, multiparty
elections. The
notion that the consolidation of continued dictatorship under Raul
Castro or other
undemocratic successors will lead to stability is an illusion.
• There should be no misunderstanding: the Cuban dictatorship today is a
destabilizing
force in the region; a demonstrated threat to our citizens and their
own; and has
proven willing to manipulate for its own self-serving purposes
humanitarian U.S.
immigration policies and the desire of the Cuban people for freedom.
• U.S. policymakers need to understand and address the fact that there
are “spoilers” in the international community who seek to accommodate or
otherwise support the Cuban dictatorship’s succession strategy at the
expense of a democratic Cuban transition and U.S. national interests.
• If the Cuban people are to succeed when the inevitable opportunity for
change occurs, the United States must support their democratic
aspirations by informing the international community of the historic
nature of the choice they must make about whether or not to support a
genuine transition in Cuba. Our top diplomatic objective must be to
build an international consensus around an understanding that the Cuban
people have a right to determine their future and that their sovereignty
should be
returned to them.
• The democracies of the Western Hemisphere should take a leading role
in guiding Cuba on a path that leads to representative democracy. The
mileposts along tha t path are the benchmarks set forth in the
Inter-American Democratic Charter.
• We must help the Cuban people define an alternative future for
themselves – one
where Cubans can live in peace, justice prevails, and alternative views
are
respected.
• We need to help reassure Cubans on the island who seek to preserve the
status quo out of fear of what lies beyond the end of the dictatorship.
We must also advance an
alternative view of the future for Cubans currently in the regime who
support
democratic change. They need to know that they and their families will
also have a
future in a Free Cuba. It is only Castro’s “esbirros” (henchmen) who
need to fear
justice.
• For all Cubans, we must underscore that the future is theirs to define
and that the U.S. and our citizens pose no threat to their security or
their homes. We must also be clear that there is but one Cuban people
and that reconciliation will be essential to securing a Free Cuba.
EMPOWERING THE CUBAN PEOPLE
Since 1952, Cubans have lived under a succession of dictators, first
under Fulgencio
Batista, and then Batista’s totalitarian successor, Fidel Castro. Until
recently, the Castro dictatorship had been able to maintain its grip on
the Cuban people by repressing the development of independent civil
society and keeping the Cuban people on a desperate hunt for dollars and
basic necessities, thereby preventing the emergence of a viable
alternative to its failed policies. By promoting fear about the future
and distrust amongst each other, the regime has sought to keep civil
society stunted and the Cuban people under its control.
That control is increasingly being degraded by a Cuban society fed up
with broken
promises and the failure of the regime to meet its basic needs. Growing
popular discontent, the failure of regime-sponsored Actos de Repudio to
intimidate the opposition, and increasing negative international opinion
have weakened the regime and placed it on the defensive. There now is a
growing consensus among the Cuban people of the need for democracy.
Offering to help Cubans meet their basic and unmet social desires and
humanitarian
needs will be a powerful force for change and the best guarantor that
the transition to
freedom will succeed in rapidly restoring sovereignty to the Cuban
people through free,
multi-party elections. Cubans can better face the uncertainty of change
if they are
reassured that their basic humanitarian needs will be met.
The Rising Cuban Democratic Opposition
The last several years have witnessed a sustained increase in the
ability of the
Cuban opposition to engage in acts of resistance, mobilize greater
segments of the Cuban population, and communicate a positive vision for
the future to the Cuban people and the international community.
At the grassroots level, youth, women, and Afro-Cubans are key
constituencies for
the continued growth of Cuba’s civil society movement. More than half of
Cuba’s
population is under age 35 and has the weakest attachment to the Castro
revolution and the strongest desire for real change. Afro-Cubans and
mixed-ethnicity Cubans comprise 62 percent of the population and are
increasingly aware of their gross under-representation in leadership
positions. They continue to be socially marginalized by the regime
elite, and Afro-Cuban youths are a consistent target of police
harassment, intimidation, arrest, and expulsion out of Havana and other
parts of Cuba. Castro’s Cuba has become a major sex tourism destination
and is a source country for women and children trafficked for the
purposes of sexual exploitation.
Despite Castro’s efforts to repress and intimidate, the opposition has
made great
strides in mobilizing these groups. Women and Afro-Cubans are at the
forefront of the
opposition which includes Martha Beatriz Roque of the Assembly to
Promote Civil
Society; imprisoned activists such as Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet; the dozens
of the organizers of Oswaldo Paya’s Varela Project; and independent
journalists such as Guillermo Fariñas, who is engaged in a sustained
hunger strike for uncensored access to the Internet for ordinary Cubans.
The Damas de Blanco, the mothers and wives of the 75 activists
imprisoned during the regime’s March 2003 crackdown on the peaceful
opposition, remain a powerful and visible domestic and international
symbol of the current struggle for freedom and democracy in Cuba and a
focal point for non-violent resistance efforts.
Significant challenges remain, however, before the democratic opposition
and civic movement can move beyond protest and non-cooperation with the
regime and become the catalysts for and implementers of a sea change
within Cuba. Above all, the civic
movement needs additional support to present to their fellow Cubans a
viable alternative to the failed policies of the Castro regime. The
experience of East European civic movements in organizing resistance
that ended repressive dictatorships, and then in assuming leadership
that led to freedom, prosperity, and reconciliation in their
respective countries, could be particularly helpful for Cuba’s
developing opposition movement. In addition, if requested, civil society
groups could benefit from greater training to prepare to help lead a
democratic transition and future government in Cuba.
It is critical that independent Cuban civil society groups continue to
gain greater access to basic modern equipment to help expand
distribution of independent information and facilitate prodemocracy
activities. Continued access to these types of equipment help Cuba’s
civil society disseminate information to the Cuban people and counter
regime efforts to maintain its grip on the Cuban people through
exclusive control over all forms of communication.
In particular, the Cuban people, and especially the civic opposition
movement, need
access to the Internet. Currently, the Castro regime strictly controls
all access to the
Internet, limiting access to a few websites to hand-picked regime
supporters and foreigners at specially identified internet cafes, which
are out of the reach of the average Cuban.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Recommendations include the following:
Cuba Fund for a Democratic Future
To empower the Cuban people and the Cuban democratic opposition to take
advantage of these new opportunities, the Commission recommends the Cuba
Fund for a Democratic Future: $80 million over two years to increase
support for Cuban civil society, expand international awareness, break
the regime’s information blockade, and continue developing assistance
initiatives to help Cuban civil society realize a democratic transition.
The Commission also recommends consistent yearly funding of Cuba
democracy programs at no less than $20 million on an annual basis
thereafter until the dictatorship ceases to exist.
This fund should include:
• Support to independent civil society on the island ($31 million);
• Funding for education and exchanges, including on- island university
training from third countries and scholarships for economically
disadvantaged students from Cuba identified by independent
nongovernmental entities and civic organizations at U.S. and third
country universities (including historically black and faith-based
institutions)
($10 million);
• Efforts to break the Castro regime’s information blockade and expand
the
Cuban people’s access to independent information, including through the
Internet ($24 million); and
• Support for international efforts at strengthening civil society and
in
transition planning ($15 million).
IV. BREAK THE REGIME’S INFORMATION BLOCKADE
The Castro regime continues to control all means of mass media and
communication on the island. The regime exerts absolute control over
newspapers, radio, and television through a pervasive system of
repression, intimidation, seizures of
equipment, and arrest. The regime fears the day that the Cuban people
have full access to independent information. The lack of access to
independent information enables the government to maintain a climate of
fear of repression and fear of change across the island necessary to its
continued survival.
The recommendations of CAFC I to break the information blockade have
been
successful in getting a greater flow of information to the Cuban people
than ever before.
Broadcasts of Radio and TV Marti from an airborne platform have reached
Cubans across the island in unprecedented numbers and have overcome the
ability of the Cuban regime to jam and disrupt broadcast signals. The
expanded distribution of media, including newsletters and videos, and
equipment have empowered even greater numbers of the Cuban people to
obtain reliable information on events in Cuba and on alternatives to the
failed policies of the Castro regime.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Selected recommendations include the following:
In conjunction with the recommended measures to strengthen civil society
and
international solidarity with the Cuban democratic opposition, the
Commission
recommends measures to intensify efforts to break the regime’s
information blockade and aid the Cuban people in the ongoing transition:
Broadcasting
Advances in the development of new and improved technologies make it
increasingly possible to expand broadcasts of reliable information to
the Cuban people and to equip them to receive and disseminate such
information across the island. The
Commission recommends the following measures be taken to expand on the
work already underway by U.S. broadcasting entities in support of Cuban
civil society:
• Fund the transmission of TV Marti via Satellite TV into Cuba by the
most effective
means possible;
• Within 90 days conduct a comprehensive and independent review on ways
to improve
Cuba broadcasts;
• Fund civil society groups to provide equipment to receive
international broadcasts and independent media on the island to the
Cuban people;
• Expand use of third-country broadcasting into Cuba;
• Replicate the successes of other U.S. broadcast programming in
developing a larger
audience, by developing non-traditional programs addressed to Cuban
youth;
• Support the training and equipping of independent print, radio, and TV
journalists in
Cuba and improve their capacity and capability to inform the world and
the Cuban
people of events in Cuba; and
• In connection with and/or as part of the strategic communication plan,
establish
quarterly meetings between appropriate U.S. Government agencies to
coordinate
strategy on broadcasting and communications to the Cuban people.
IV. UNDERMINING THE REGIME’S SUCCESSION STRATEGY
Diplomacy and information must be employed to create momentum for
genuine
change in order to undermine the regime’s succession strategy.
There should be no misunderstanding: the Castro brothers’ dictatorship
has every
intention of continuing its stranglehold on power in Cuba, regardless of
the cost to or the will of the Cuban people. Just as Fidel Castro
replaced Batista in 1959, Cuba’s current dictator wants to impose his
brother on the Cuban people. The regime’s goal is to pass power from
Fidel Castro to his selected successor, Raul Castro, and the ruling
elite around him. Regime loyalists are relentlessly pursuing a strategy
whereby the international community will recognize and work with a
successor regime, regardless of whether or not the dictatorship has been
dismantled. In furtherance of this goal, the regime is actively
strengthening its repressive apparatus, re-consolidating its absolute
control over all political, social and economic aspects of Cuban
society, and using Venezuelan money to acquire international support and
legitimacy.
The Castro regime is actively seeking to control the policy environment
on
transition in concert with opponents of peaceful, democratic change, led
by the Chavez
government in Venezuela. The regime is implementing information and
influence
campaigns to develop support networks outside of Cuba to provide it
additional revenue
streams today, to act as advocates on its behalf against U.S. policy
toward Cuba and the region, and to support and secure international
legitimacy for a succession within the revolution. These networks
undermine the opportunity for a democratic future for Cuba; U.S.
national security interests in Cuba and in third countries; and our
interest in a democratic and stable Venezuela.
The regime will seek to create domestic and international pressure on
the U.S.
Government to unilaterally change our Cuba policy and establish a new
relationship with the regime regardless of whether or not the
dictatorship has been dismantled or the economy freed.
Fidel Castro senses his own mortality and the mortality of the
economically
bankrupt regime he leads. He works relentlessly to hold it together
through a mix of
political alliances, bartering and debt extensions, and savage denial of
political and
economic freedoms to the Cuban people. Today, he and his inner circle
are implementing a succession strategy designed to ensure the survival
of the regime beyond his own incapacitation, death, or ouster.
Cuba’s ever-deepening relationship with Venezuela parallels the earlier
failed
relationship with the Soviet Union, only this time not as the junior
partner: Fidel Castro is calling the shots.
This Castro- led axis must be understood as part of the regime’s
succession strategy
and an effort to insulate Cuba from pressure for democratic change. This
axis is designed to secure energy and financial resources and create an
external support network to help ensure the regime is insulated.
This axis also undermines our interest in a more democratic Venezuela
and
undermines democratic governance and institutions elsewhere in the
region. Together,
these countries are advancing an alternative retrograde and
anti-American agenda for the hemisphere’s future and they are finding
some resonance with populist governments and disenfranchised populations
in the region. Castro hopes a political shift in the region will be his
legacy and offer a measure of protection for his “esbirros” and
opportunists in the Cuban Communist Party upon his departure from power.
The weak flank of the Cuba-Venezuela axis is Cuba itself. Unlike
“Bolivarian”
President Hugo Chavez, the Castro regime lacks even the patina of
electoral legitimacy.
History will remember that Castro always avoided the verdict of the
Cuban people. Castro today must worry about the growing frustration of
the Cuban population about the failings of the revolution and with
expenditures in far- flung reaches of the world when their needs are
unmet at home. There are signs the axis with Venezuela is beginning to
grate on Cuban nationalist sensibilities. The more than 11 million
people in Cuba are, in fact, our natural allies in breaking both the
dictatorship and the Cuba-Venezuela axis that protects and sustains it.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Selected recommendations include the following:
• The Commission recommends that Cuba, specifically Cuba’s impending
transition,
continue to have a high profile in public messages and statements by
U.S. officials to
build a sense of momentum for change. The Commission is also
recommending a
diplomatic strategy to consistently advance our view that there is an
opportunity for
transition if we act today; that the Cuban people are more active than
ever despite
intense pressure from the regime; and that we need to commit to
defending the right of
the Cuban people to define their own future;
• In making a recommendation that a suspension of Title III of the 1996
Cuban Liberty and Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act for an individual
country is necessary to the national interest and will expedite a
transition to democracy in Cuba, consider in particular whether it is
engaged in a process of support for regime succession;
• Vigorously enforce Title IV of the Libertad Act; particularly focusing
enforcement action on traffickers involved in strategic industries
such as oil, tourism, nickel, tobacco, and rum which finance Cuba's
repressive apparatus; and
• Encourage Cuban workers in tourism, mining, and other sectors who
work for foreign companies to keep complete wage records.
A Diplomatic Campaign: Underscore Regime Illegitimacy and Build Support
for
Transition
While differences of opinion about U.S. embargo policy persist, an
increasing
number of countries share the view that there must be change in Cuba and
that the Cuban people should have the right to decide their future.
Since the March 2003 crackdown on pro-democracy forces, the ongoing
rollback of freedoms, and growing use of Actos de Repudio to intimidate
Cuban society, many now publicly condemn the regime’s abuses.
Political and civic leaders and organizations across Europe and Latin
America that once struggled for freedom in their own countries are
expanding outreach to the Cuban people and directly assisting
pro-democratic forces in their quest for freedom and respect for basic
human rights.
If the Cuban people are to succeed in their struggle to regain their
freedom and
sovereignty, the international community must increase their engagement
with and support to Cuban civil society. There should be full agreement
that the only acceptable result of Fidel Castro’s incapacitation, death,
or ouster is for a genuine democratic transition to take place in Cuba.
This is an historic and stark choice between the continuation of
dictatorship or the restoration of freedom and sovereignty to eleven
million men, women, and children
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Selected recommendations include the following:
Recognizing the need to solidify international consensus around the
right of the
Cuban people to determine their democratic future, and promote greater
direct involvement by third-countries in Cuba, we recommend the
implementation of a diplomatic campaign to include:
• Encourage convergence of goals and efforts by other democratic nations
to support a
democratic transition in Cuba with our own efforts, including transition
planning
exercises, and encouraging bilateral engagement between European nations
and
Western Hemisphere democracies on a Cuban transition;
• Build a coalition of countries to support a democratic transition in
Cuba now and at a
moment of change on the island;
• Work diplomatically with the OAS and its member states to ensure that
adherence
to the Inter-American Democratic Charter is the standard for Cuba’s
reintegration in the inter-American system, in keeping with the
Declaration of
Florida adopted at the XXXV OAS General Assembly;
• Expand support for third-country efforts to promote the development of
Cuban
civil society and pro-democracy groups on the island;
• Encourage democratic governments, especially Community of Democracies
participants from the Western Hemisphere and Europe, to invite leaders
of the
democratic opposition to their countries for meetings with government
officials
and civic society leaders;
• Draw a distinction between countries that support succession (such as
Venezuela
and Iran) and countries that support the right of the Cuban people to
debate and
define a democratic future for Cuba;
• Invigorate examination of Cuban abuses at international organizations:
o Encourage presentation of cases to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights on behalf of victims of government sponsored mob attacks
known as Actos de Repudio; and
o Encourage other nations to address Cuban labor violations at the ILO.
IDENTIFY AND TARGET HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS
As part of U.S. policy aimed at undermining the regime’s succession
strategy, we
must accelerate the process of stripping away layers of support within
the regime by
creating additional uncertainty regarding the political and legal future
of those in leadership positions.
We explicitly reject the notion of “witch hunts” in a democratic Cuba
against those
in government positions. However, Cubans at all levels of the government
must understand that those currently in leadership positions who have
engaged in or misused subordinates to perpetuate human rights abuses
today will be duly noted and appropriately sanctioned by the U.S.
Government as authorized by U.S. law and where applicable.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Selected recommendations include the following:
• Lista de Esbirros: Place the names of those credibly believed to be
involved in
orchestrating human rights abuses in Cuba into the Abuse Case Evaluation
System (ACES) database that is currently maintained and managed by the
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor at the State Department;
• Place the names of individuals involved in the 2003 and subsequent
trials of
opposition activists, as well as those involved in orchestrating Actos
de Repudio,
on the visa lookout database;
• Amend Presidential Proclamation 5377 to permit the denial of
immigrant, as well
as non-immigrant visas, to officers and employees of the Government of
Cuba
or the Communist Party of Cuba;
• Authorize denial of the right to adjust status to legal permanent
alien to any
regime official when such an act would be detrimental to the interests
of the
United States;
• Remove from the visa lookout database those officials that have quit
the regime,
publicly advocated their commitment to and take concrete steps to
demonstrate
their support for democratic change on the island, and who are otherwise
not
believed to be ineligible for entry into the U.S.; and,
• Submit the names of officials indicted for the murder of the
“Brothers-to-the-
Rescue” pilots to Interpol.
MAKING MIGRATION SAFE, ORDERLY, AND A FORCE FOR CHANGE IN CUBA
The Cuban government has failed to honor its commitments under the
September 9,
1994, Joint Communiqué and the May 2, 1995, Joint Statement, otherwise
known as the “Migration Accords.” While the 1994 Joint Communiqué
obligates Cuba to take measures to ensure that migration is safe, legal,
and orderly, the Cuban government continues to deny U.S. officials
permission to monitor returned migrants outside of Havana; facilitate
the departure of thousands of Cubans annually over the land borders into
the U.S. via Mexico; deny exit permits to otherwise qualified Cuban
citizens, making some people wait for years to emigrate; and flatly
prohibit others from emigrating, including doctors and family members of
government officials.
The regime has also enacted a series of other bureaucratic measures that
impede the
U.S. Interests Section’s efforts to meet the U.S. commitments under the
Agreement. As detailed in CAFC I, with these and other mechanisms, the
Castro regime continues to manipulate migration flows to the United
States. The regime does so to further its policies of generating
additional hard currency and as a means to control its population
releasing pressure when necessary by permitting more exits. The regime
further seeks to dampen the efforts of Cuban activists working for
change by withholding exit permission to attend international
conferences or receive awards.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Selected recommendations include:
In response to Cuba’s repeated and consistent efforts to impede safe,
legal, and
orderly migration, we recommend a series of diplomatic efforts to notify
the Castro regime of its failure to meet its obligations under the
Migration Accords and protesting its efforts to interfere with and
disrupt U.S. migration policy.
VI. DENYING REVENUE TO THE CASTRO REGIME
The policies of the Castro regime continue to debilitate the Cuban
economy,
impoverish the Cuban people, and isolate Cuba from economic advances
enjoyed by the rest of the Western Hemisphere. The regime ignores its
obligations to its people and diverts its resources to maintain its grip
on power, manage a succession of the regime, and destabilize democracies
elsewhere in the Hemisphere. The more financially stressed the system
is, the more difficult it will be for any leader who follows Fidel
Castro to preside over a succession within the dictatorship The first
report of the Commission recommended, and the President directed be
implemented, a comprehensive set of measures to deny the Castro regime
the revenues it needs to maintain its repressive security apparatus. By
the regime’s own admission, these
measures — and continued enforcement actions — have sharply cut licensed
and
unlicensed travel to the island each year since the implementation of
the measures of the first report.
Limitations on travel, parcel deliveries and remittances have sharply
curtailed the
regime’s manipulation of and profiteering from U.S. humanitarian
policies. These
measures have been successful and should continue to be implemented.
In order to undermine the regime’s succession strategy, it is critical
that the U.S.
Government maintain economic pressure on the regime to limit its ability
to sustain itself and repress the Cuban people. Moreover, as we rapidly
approach the transitional moment, the more economic pressure there is on
the regime, the greater the likelihood there will be dramatic and
successful change for the Cuban people.
Improved Enforcement
The Castro regime continues to seek new and additional ways to raise
desperately
needed hard currency by encouraging and facilitating unlicensed cash
flows and travel from the United States to Cuba. The profits from these
transactions continue to be critical for the maintenance of the regime’s
repressive security apparatus. The regime has facilitated the
establishment of third-country travel and remittance companies whose
primary purpose is to facilitate unlicensed transactions from the United
States and to help individuals evade U.S. restrictions on such
transactions. Similarly, in the last several years we have witnessed a
surge in attempts to abuse existing license categories to engage in no
permissible activities, such as tourism or other non-licensable visits.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Selected recommendations include:
• Establish an inter-agency Law Enforcement Task Force for better
enforcement of U.S.
economic sanctions on the Castro regime; and
• Issue a directive to law enforcement agencies to pursue criminal
investigations,
including prosecution, where possible and appropriate, of Cuban Assets
Control
Regulation and other violations, especially for those found to have been
involved in
organizing or facilitating unlicensed travel transactions with Cuba.
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Regulations:
• Prohibit individuals who wish to send remittances from going directly
to third-country
institutions to send such remittances to Cuba and require instead that
all remittances
be sent through licensed U.S. remittance forwarders. Eliminate the use
of cash-card
services for licensed travel to Cuba;
• Expand the list of regime officials and agencies which are not
permitted to receive
licensed remittances, and ensure that those included in the “Lista de
Esbirros” do
not benefit from U.S. humanitarian policies by including them on the
list of
Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) and by barring SDNs from receiving
remittances;
• Implement new licensing criteria and reporting requirements for travel
service
providers (TSPs) and Carrier Service Providers (CSPs), including a
requirement that
TSPs and CSPs have an independent financial audit conducted annually;
and
• Expand the use of Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) to designate
companies,
including front companies, engaged in efforts to promote the sale of
Cuban goods or
unlicensed travel, remittances, and other transactions from the United
States to
Cuba.
U.S. Department of Commerce Regulations:
• Revise temporary sojourn license (TSL) regulations and implementing
guidelines to
ensure that licenses are not issued to maritime vessels, unless the
vessel is solely
registered to transport goods and is engaged in the regular transport of
bulk
commodities, or unless otherwise consistent with the foreign policy
interests of the
United States;
• Revise regulations and implementing guidelines to deny export
licenses, consistent
with U.S. law, for discretionary, cosmetic, or other medical equipment
sales that
would be destined to be used in large-scale medical programs that cater
to tourists
and foreign patients and not exclusively for the benefit and care of the
Cuban
people;
• Develop effective monitoring and certification requirements for
medical equipment
exports that ensure that these exports are used only for the use and
benefit of the
Cuban people and not diverted to tourist or foreign care institutions;
• Ensure monitoring for medical equipment is undertaken for the life of
the product to
ensure items exported are at intended end-use institutions. In the event
that the
Cuban government does not permit on-site monitoring at certain
institutions, future
exports will not be authorized to such locations;
• Reaffirm the U.S. Government’s export license policy of a strict
general policy of
denial of Commerce export licenses, unless otherwise required by
existing law; and
• Tighten regulations for the export of humanitarian items, other than
agricultural or
medical commodities, to ensure that exports are consigned to entities
that support
independent civil society and are not regime administered or controlled
organizations, such as the Cuban Council of Churches.
Target Regime Foreign Income and Assets Abroad
Following the reductions in regime revenue as a result of the first
Commission
report, nearly half of the regimes’ current foreign income is now
derived from nickel
exports. The revenue from these sales does not go to benefit the Cuban
people, but is
diverted to maintain the regime’s repressive security apparatus and fund
Castro’s
interventionist and destabilizing policies in other countries in the
Hemisphere.
Moreover, some of this revenue is derived from assets illegally
expropriated from U.S. citizens after Castro came to power. In addition,
there is growing evidence of senior elements of the regime, engaging in
efforts to hide personal financial assets abroad to guard against a
severe disruption in their stations in the event of a democratic
transition in Cuba. These assets, including property and bank accounts,
rightfully belong to the Cuban people and should be tracked down and
returned to Cuba for the benefit of a Free Cuba Government.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
To hasten the end of the Castro regime by disrupting the regime’s
sources of foreign
income and identifying regime assets abroad, we recommend the U.S.
Government:
• Establish an inter-agency Cuban Nickel Targeting Task Force to
reinvigorate the
existing nickel import certification and control regime and analogous
cobalt import
control regime, consistent with our domestic and international
obligations.
• Invigorate identification and targeting of regime offshore finances
and assets and
initiate a diplomatic effort to engage international partners and
organizations to
assist in developing information on and targeting regime assets abroad.
• Reconvene Cuban Assets Targeting Group with the task of identifying
additional
ways to target and disrupt regime foreign income, including
identification of the
assets of regime officials abroad, development of information on
official corruption
and associated assets abroad.
CHAPTER 2
HELPING CUBANS RESPOND
TO CRITICAL HUMANITARIAN
AND SOCIAL NEEDS
Introduction
The Castro regime trumpets “the achievements of the Revolution” in
meeting the
basic needs of the Cuban people. In truth, the entire system has been
constructed for the sustenance of the regime, not to serve the Cuban
people or to allow for development and economic growth. With the sudden
withdrawal of massive Soviet subsidies in the early 1990’s, the regime
found it almost impossible to maintain the mythology of the revolution’s
achievements. Today, Cubans live with the consequences of the regime’s
deliberate decision to sustain itself at the expense of its people:
declining food stocks, increasing water shortages, crumbling medical
infrastructure, the disappearance of basic medicines, and devastated
housing stock. Although the regime continues to manipulate health and
other statistics and restricts access to its medical facilities for
people who might tell the real story of the revolution’s failure to meet
the needs of the Cuban people, it is clear from independent sources that
chronic malnutrition, polluted drinking water, and untreated chronic
diseases affect a significant percentage of the Cuban population.
A Cuban Transition Government
1
will need to do what the current regime has never done: to put the needs
of the people before the need to maintain absolute control. The Cuban
Transition Government will face daunting challenges as it begins to
address the basic human needs of the Cuban people. The Cuban people will
expect rapid and effective action. In order to ensure the support of the
public, the Cuban Transition Government should quickly identify priority
actions and mobilize internal and external resources to sustain them.
The Cuban Transition Government will want to avoid the onset of a
complex human disaster that could be used as an excuse for those who
might wish to restore the repressive regime in Cuba.
1
This Report uses the term “Cuban Transition Government” to refer to a
Cuban
Government that is eligible to receive U.S. assistance under applicable
U.S. law,
particularly the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act. All
recommendations for potential future assistance in this paper are
premised on the
assumption that the proposed action satisfies the requirements of
applicable U.S. law.
There are numerous restrictions under U.S. law that affect assistance
for, and transactions with, Cuba. In the event of a Cuban Transition
Government, some such restrictions could be removed through executive
branch action, but others may require legislative change.
Despite these various restrictions, certain assistance for Cuba may be
provided in certain circumstances on the basis of laws that authorize
assistance "notwithstanding any other provision of law" or on the basis
of certain extraordinary general waiver authorities in the Foreign
Assistance Act.
Another matter that the Cuban Transition Government will want to address
is the
likelihood, under any scenario, that internal migration could become a
problem. Large
numbers of impoverished rural residents could flood the cities where
there is hope of
increased income, relief supplies, and Government services. Such a
massive influx could result in large numbers of “internally-displaced”
people, squatting on public land and erecting temporary shelters without
adequate food, sanitation, health care or potable water.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and faith-based groups already
play an
integral role in providing vital humanitarian assistance to rural
populations and churches in Cuba. Their support to the Cuban people at
the time of transition, where they have established relationships and
information about the needs in these localities, will be essential to
the success of the Cuban Transition Government’s efforts to complete a
rapid and successful transition and hold free and fair multiparty
elections.
The U.S. Government stands ready to help the Cuban Transition Government
to
avert humanitarian emergency in Cuba by assisting the Government in
addressing the
immediate water, sanitation, health, food, shelter, protection, and
education needs of the Cuban people and working to bring other
international partners into the process of
assistance. Assisting a Cuban Transition Government to meet these basic
needs is
paramount for a stable transition period, new Government credibility,
and timely elections.
Humanitarian assistance could include support in the following sectors:
(1) water
and sanitation; (2) health systems and nutrition; (3) food security; (4)
shelter and
settlements; (5) protection; and (6) education services. This collective
humanitarian
support will help facilitate a Cuban- led democratic transition.
Sovereign governments are responsible for the welfare of their own
citizens and for
others in their care (e.g., refugees, asylum seekers, migrants, etc.).
U.S. Government
assistance and that of the international community should be provided to
support, not
substitute for, the new Cuban Transition Government’s responsibility for
its people. The
Transition Government should actively encourage and contribute available
resources
(human and financial) for humanitarian relief activities to reduce human
suffering and
prevent collapse.
Critical to a successful humanitarian response is the ability of all
parties to quickly,
and preferably locally, access required resources such as fuel,
logistics and communications systems. Equally important in the initial
stages is U.S. Government and international support for local Cuban
media efforts. The public should have access to information regarding
the Cuban Transition Government’s humanitarian response efforts to
ensure the public is aware, understands, and remains supportive of these
activities.
Any U.S. Government assistance provided in response to requests by the
Cuban
Transition Government would follow four principles:
(1) coordination with the Transition
Government, international organizations, bilateral donors, and
international and existing Cuban assistance organizations;
(2) addressing the most critical humanitarian needs;
(3) identifying and prioritizing critical needs of vulnerable
populations first (e.g., women,
children, elderly, disabled, displaced, chronically-ill and
chronically-underserved
populations); and
(4) seeking to do no harm to individuals, households, the culture, the
economy, security, and the environment.
By providing assistance according to these principles, the U.S.
Government can
help the Cuban Transition Government guarantee political freedom,
economic opportunity and hold free and fair multiparty elections.
Water and Sanitation
Cuba today faces daunting water-supply and sanitation issues, including
inoperative
sewage treatment plants. In the entire country, there are only five
municipal wastewater plants, and only four percent of the sewage
effluent has some degree of treatment. Water and sewer pipeline networks
are in shambles. Havana’s population of over two million people uses a
sewer system designed for a population of 600,000. Havana’s wastewater
flow receives primary treatment only, and excess flow is discharged with
minimal, if any, treatment.
Insufficient levels of wastewater treatment and the lack of sewer
pipelines have
caused a degradation of the water quality. Runoff from heavily treated
fields with
fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides, as well as the discharge of
untreated effluents from cities and industries such as sugar mills,
sugar-by-products, food processing plants, and mining operations, also
severely pollute surface and groundwater in Cuba.
As a result, only 62 percent of Cubans have reasonable access to
disinfected water. Trash pickup is intermittently undertaken, which
perpetuates the proliferation of mini-dumpsites in populated areas and
near the perimeters of boarding schools and students/workers' camps.
There are also alarming difficulties in the hygienic cond itions of
dumpsites and deficient handling and disposal of hazardous waste from
hospitals, which creates a serious health risk.
In light of these conditions, the Cuban Transition Government may
request U.S.
Government and other donor support to prevent and control the possible
outbreak of
sanitation-related infectious diseases in rural and urban areas.
If requested, the U.S. Government could support efforts to ensure
critical water and
sanitation services for the Cuban people. The U.S. Government can work
with the Cuban Transition Government, international agencies, and other
donors to:
(1) ensure access to adequate quantity and quality of potable water;
(2) develop accessible human-waste and wastewater disposal facilities;
(3) ensure access to garbage/solid-waste collection and
disposal facilities;
(4) assist local communities in the planning and implementation of
environmental- health interventions;
(5) help prevent sanitation-related disease; and
(6) offer assistance to local operations and management to improve the
existing operation of sanitation facilities.
Should the Cuban Transition Government request U.S. assistance to
address critical
water and sanitation needs, the U.S. Government could do the following:
• Help address the needs for potable water and sanitation in major urban
and rural
populations;
• Provide chlorine or other water-treatment materials;
• Assist with water trucks to deliver water to needy communities;
• Provide technical assistance and other materials for the construction
of new wells in
needy and vulnerable communities;
• Assist with garbage trucks to collect and dispose of garbage in major
urban (or rural)
areas, and in vulnerable population centers;
• Provide soap, disinfectant, and cleaning materials to vulnerable
groups;
• Support infectious disease surveillance, especially in areas
identified to have an
increased risk of disease outbreaks; and
• Support hygiene-education programs in any sanitation-related
interventions, and
provide technical assistance for mass-media public-information campaigns
health
and sanitation.
Should the Cuban Transition Government request U.S. assistance once
critical
needs have been addressed, the U.S. Government could provide the
following assistance during the recovery phase:
• Help ensure sanitation facilities are operational, adequately staffed
and functioning;
• Work with the Cuban Transition Government to ensure local communities
are actively
involved in identifying and addressing their ongoing critical needs, and
in
monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of existing sanitation
interventions;
involve local and city governments to develop and implement
environmental-health
education programs using interna tionally recognized models such as
Community
Participation Problem-Solving: The Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation
Transformation (PHAST) Approach or the Assessing Community Excellence in
Environmental Health (PACE-EH) approach promoted by the National
Association
of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO); and
• Work with the Transition Government to ensure national policies and
infrastructure
increase the long-term capacity of local communities to manage
effectively the
operation and maintenance of water and sanitation facilities through
training and
technical support.
Health-Care and Nutrition
Despite one of the highest per capita rates of doctors in the world and
the ability to
purchase medicines and medical devices from U.S. companies and the rest
of the
international community for use in Cuban hospitals, the Cuban
health-care system lacks basic supplies and equipment to treat the Cuban
people on a daily basis. The regime has chosen its priority: health
spending on services and medicines for foreigners, rather than its own
citizens. Today, the regime is increasingly sending its doctors abroad
and diverting even more of its medical resources to the treatment of
foreigners in Cuba. In a form of medical apartheid, hospitals that treat
regime officials and foreigners who pay hard currency have modern
equipment, clean halls, and adequate staffing, whereas hospitals that
treat the average Cuban lack basic medical supplies, such as bandages
and over-the-counter painkillers, have filthy hallways, insufficient
lighting, and are understaffed. Should a health or nutrition emergency
arise when a Cuban transition occurs, quick assistance could help the
Cuban Transition Government respond.
Potential U.S. Government responses to the array of possible needs
during a
transition may be divided between actions necessary for critical
life-saving response and those available during a recovery phase.
If requested, the U.S. Government working with United Nations (UN)
organizations, the international community, other donors, the U.S.
private sector, and other partners could provide critical health and
nutrition assistance in three major areas:
1) Preventing and Addressing Acute Malnutrition
• School systems could provide nutritional supplements to children to
maintain an
adequate diet until the new Government can stabilize its own
public-health and
medical system;
• The U.S. Government can support the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF),
other partners, and health facilities to implement supplementary feeding
programs
and community therapeutic-care programs for the treatment of global
acute
malnutrition and severe acute malnutrition;
• The U.S. Government, in coordination with the UN (The Pan American
Health
Organization (PAHO) and UNICEF) and others can assist local health and
local/decentralized Government facilities to provide primary health care
focus on
preventing and treating killer diseases, such as diarrhea, acute
respiratory illness,
and preventing the recurrence of measles;
• The U.S. Government could assist the Transition Government, UNICEF,
local health
facilities, and other partners to conduct immunization campaigns and
vitamin A
deficiency, assess quality control, and continue of routine
immunizations of all
children and those under five not already immunized; and
• Assist local health and local/decentralized Government facilities to
rehabilitate key
local health infrastructure for effective delivery of care.
2) Ensure Supply of Drugs and Emergency Medical Commodities
• Help ensure adequate supplies of health and surgical kits are
available;
• Provide HIV/AIDS testing kits to verify access to a safe blood supply;
and
• Utilize nutritional and health-assessment information to inform where
to direct acute
and non-acute food, medical and surgical supplies and kits.
3) Detect and Respond to Immediate Health and Nutrition Needs
• Conduct hands-on needs assessment to provide objective data and
observations on the
state of health care, nutrition, and basic social services; and
• Conduct infectious-disease surveillance, and recommend actions for
assistance where water, sanitation, and health conditions are poor or
potentially harmful.
It will be crucial for the Cuban Transition Government to quickly
ascertain the
health status or health care at the individual or community level.
Therefore, supporting a functioning health system, preventing disease
outbreaks, and other important health-care needs is essential for a
healthy population to aid the Cuba Transition Government in guaranteeing
political freedom, economic opportunity, and hold free and fair
elections. If health and nutrition needs are limited or are under
control, the U.S. Government could assist a Cuban Transition Government
and other partners in recovery phase efforts in the following three
priority areas, if requested:
1) Support Surveillance Systems to Detect and Control Infectious
Diseases
Health and nutrition-surveillance systems monitor and help prevent
potential
disease outbreaks. Assessments can reveal the capacity of Cuban
hospitals, clinics and physicians to identify and respond to outbreaks
of infectious diseases during a transition, and help create surveillance
systems appropriate for Cuban health and nutrition needs. If Cuban
health systems reveal weaknesses, the U.S. Government and others could
support local health and local/decentralized Government facilities with
the following actions, if necessary:
• Conduct routine, sentinel, or survey surveillance of key infectious
diseases;
• Respond to evidence of declining immunization coverage by delivering
immunizations throughout the country through campaigns or routine clinic
visits
depending on, the state of health- facility and cold-chain
infrastructure; and
• Revise and update existing national health emergency preparedness
plans to respond
to the, potential spread of new infectious diseases, such as pandemic
influenza.
2) Meet the Ongoing Health Needs of Vulnerable Populations
If necessary, the U.S. Government could aid the Cuban Transition
Government in
identifying possible gaps in health-care by providing assistance to
accomplish the
following:
• Improve the quality of epidemiological data-collection to determine
where needs exist
for short-term actions, and help with the preparation of long-term
health-sector
plans;
• Assistance to help maintain the care of Cubans with chronic
conditions; and
• Provide assistance to help re-staff health clinics that are
understaffed or are otherwise
not functional.
3) Support Continued Functioning of the Cuban Health System
Ensuring that the Cuban health system is operational and opened up to
serve all
Cubans is critical for the welfare of the Cuban people. Assessments and
surveillance
systems can reveal obstacles, gaps, or deterioration in health care. If
issues are identified and the Cuban Transition Government requests
support, the U.S. Government could support the Cubans and others to
conduct the following:
• Evaluate the quality and safety of basic health care, including
hospitals, health-care
providers, elderly and nursing home care, maternal, child health ,
referral networks,
logistics, essential drug-supply systems, and emergency transportation;
and
• Help Cuban health-care providers in assisting the Transition
Government to review
health-related laws, regulations and policies to determine changes
necessary for
sustaining and/or improving quality of health care to maintain social
protection,
and, the proper monitoring and control of infectious diseases.
Food Security
Mismanaged domestic agricultural production and a long-standing drought
have led
Cuba to increasingly import food to meet basic nutritional needs.
Despite exports to Cuba from the United States of more than $1.2 billion
in agricultural products between 2001 and 2006 and regular trade with
other countries, the Cuban government has failed to meet the basic food
needs of the Cuban people. The regime’s food-rationing system provides
Cubans with less than half of their monthly food needs. To meet the
shortfall, ordinary Cubans buy food on the black market or at inflated
prices in Government-run dollar stores, if they can secure the funds.
Government-run hotels that serve foreign tourists do not experience
similar shortages.
The Cuban population’s basic food needs must be addressed for the Cuban
Transition Government to create the conditions to fully guarantee
political freedom,
economic opportunity, and hold free and fair elections. Because acute
food insecurity
could have a negative impact on the transition process, the U.S.
Government should be prepared, if requested, to work with other partners
to help the Cuban Transition
Government address the needs of affected populations.
The regime’s own statistics from 2005 indicate that at least 15 percent
of Cuba’s
population already is at severe nutritional risk. Any negative shift in
the capacity of the
Cuban Transition Government to meet basic food needs could result in
instability and
increased levels of malnutrition. Under these circumstances, vulnerable
populations are at particular risk, and could require special
consideration.
If requested, the U.S. Government can offer help in coordinating
food-security aid
activities with the Cuban Transition Government, local agencies, and
civil society groups, to meet acute and recovery needs. The U.S.
Government could help the new Government alleviate food insecurity by
doing the following:
• Improving the availability, access, and utilization of food; and
• Protecting the income and property of Cuban families by maintaining
and
strengthening traditional strategies for coping with food shortages,
such as
diversifying food sources and finding alternative income opportunities.
If assessments reveal that malnutrition and food insecurity exist, the
critical
emergency response must be rapid and effective. Upon request, the U.S.
Government
could work with the Cuban Transition Government to identify all
available existing Cuban food-distribution systems and decide which
method would be the most effective to ensure the quick delivery of food.
If requested in a recovery phase, the U.S. Government can support the
Transition
Government, Cuban farmers, and Cuban agricultural industry efforts to
evaluate which
systems are most effective for the medium and long-term distribution of
food or non-food related humanitarian aid, or general commercial
supplies, in the country.
If necessary and requested, the U.S. Government and other partners could
implement the following activities:
• Assist local and general food distribution by the UN-World Food
Program (WFP) in
accordance with internationally accepted standards to meet daily caloric
needs in
response to critical malnutrition needs in identified populations;
• If necessary, establish Community Therapeutic Feeding Centers or
traditional
Therapeutic Feeding Centers with local officials and implementing
partners to
distribute supplemental foods to vulnerable groups identified in
nutritional
assessments;
• Identify short-term Food- for-Work activities for able-bodied Cubans
in local
economic, environmental, or other immediate labor property to assist a
new
Government in creating a secure and stable community; and
• Identify and assess traditional coping mechanisms, including urban and
rural small
home gardens to supplement emergency food needs.
The Cuban Transition Government may request support for Cuba’s
agricultural and
livestock systems. If requested, the U.S. Government could assist the
Cuban Transition Government in implementing the following activities to
reduce the loss of productive assets, and maintain and strengthen
traditional crisis-coping mechanisms vital for household food security:
• Identify and coordinate with appropriate Transition Ministries, local
staff,
communities, and organizations such as the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization
(FAO) to implement critical agricultural and livestock activities;
• Support monitoring the affordability of food prices and suggest
options if prices rise
above the capacity of most households to purchase food;
• Encourage the continuation of agricultural production, and determine
its potential to
meet emergency food needs for general and/or supplemental food
distribution or
food markets;
• Provide veterinary drugs and equipment, as needed, particularly
vaccinations for
livestock to ensure the maintenance of any existing protein sources for
the
population’s nutritional health;
• Support efforts to secure fuel, spare parts, and technical assistance
to repair or to
reestablish the use of necessary agricultural machinery and equipment;
• Identify and support local market channels for agricultural inputs and
livestock needs.
If not locally available, explore moving supplies from similar
agricultural areas to
places in need; and
• Maintain food and economic access to contribute to the livelihoods of
vulnerable
households via local seed fairs or other fairs that support the
diversification of
livelihood options.
Once critical food insecurity and nutritional needs are stable, the U.S.
Government’s
efforts can focus on assisting the Cuban Transition Government and
others to improve food security. If requested, the U.S. Government could
help the Cuban Transition Government work with local authorities to
evaluate and determine the best options to improve food production and
distribution systems. If requested, the U.S. Government could assist
Cubans to build local capability to assess and address the following:
• Food-distribution patterns -- markets, general distribution;
• The availability of household income to meet additional food needs;
• Status of vulnerable populations; and
• Cuban- led efforts to strengthen local capacity to quickly identify
and manage urgent
food needs.
If it is necessary to support agricultural and livestock systems in the
recovery phase,
the U.S. Government and other partners could continue to support the
Cuban Transition Government’s efforts to assess household coping
mechanisms. Activities in the emergency phase could continue as required
by secondary assessments and regular monitoring. If requested by the
Cuban Transition Government, U.S. Government support could include the
following:
• Support efforts to help agricultural production areas secure access to
agricultural
system inputs such as identifying and providing locally adapted and
accepted seed
varieties (from existing research and educational institutions), organic
fertilizer,
tools (mechanization and irrigation), and veterinary supplies;
• Assist Cuban efforts to assess agricultural production methods that
are sustainable and contribute to meeting national and local food needs.
This can include assessing
agricultural cooperatives, land access and the removal of private market
restrictions;
• Support local veterinary and agriculture extension agents through the
provision of
supplies or (if appropriate), through training and capacity-building;
and
• Support local agricultural universities in the production and
multiplication of local
preferred seed varieties (including preservation of genetic resources),
as well as
improved local varieties of essential food commodities.
Shelter The Cuban government has allowed the island’s housing situation
to fall into severe crisis. U.S.-based housing experts have estimated
Cuba is lacking adequate housing by at least 1.6 million units. It is
commonplace for multiple families to inhabit inadequate tworoom
structures or to “squat” in unsafe buildings. In light of additional
damage and structural collapses as a result of hurricanes, it is
unlikely that a complete resolution of Cuba’s severe housing crisis will
occur during a transition period.
Yet, should the Cuban Transition Government request U.S. Government
assistance
in this area, U.S. Government actions can focus on supporting a
comprehensive assessment of Cuba’s housing needs and helping the Cuban
Transition Government provide temporary shelter to vulnerable
populations. Individuals without shelter are at increased risk of
exposure to unhealthy and unsafe conditions, such as infectious diseases
and risky behavior (including contributing to political instability).
Furthermore, if unable to find food and clean water, persons without
shelter can quickly become additional burdens on critical humanitarian
aid, which could jeopardize the ability of the Cuban Transition
Government to guarantee political freedom, economic opportunity, and
hold free and fair elections.
If requested, the U.S. Government can assist the Cuban Transition
Government and
other partners to conduct comprehensive assessments of shelter and
settlement to ensure shelter assistance: (1) is in accordance with the
priorities of local communities; (2) is supportive of the objectives of
the Cuba Transition Government; and (3) complies with recognized
international humanitarian shelter guidelines, such as those from the
Sphere Project.
Rapid, critical assessments will reveal differences between social
(e.g.,
overcrowding) and structural (e.g., repair and upgrading) issues. The
U.S. Government can then base its support upon the provision of safe,
adequate, habitable, and hazard-resistant shelter to identified
vulnerable persons. U.S. Government aid can also promote “safer
settlements” to reduce the adverse impacts of natural hazards,
unhealthy, and unsafe conditions. The aforementioned includes providing
basic, shelter-related services (e.g., water, sanitation, drainage), and
providing garbage and/or solid-waste collection and disposal services to
identified vulnerable populations.
If requested, the U.S. Government, in coordination with other partners
and local
communities, can help the Cuban Transition Government to address
critical shelter
assistance needs as follows:
• Provide safe, adequate, habitable, and hazard-resistant shelter;
basic, shelter-related
services (e.g., water, sanitation, drainage); and garbage and/or
solid-waste collection
and disposal services;
• Work with communities in designing and implementing locally-developed
interventions providing for shelter;
• Ensure all shelter and settlement interventions reflect hazard-
mitigation measures; and
• Evaluate logistics-supply systems to ensure sufficient building
supplies are available
for the timely construction of shelters, and are equitably disbursed
throughout the
country.
Once critical shelter and settlement needs are addressed or are stable,
if requested,
the U.S. Government can support the Cuban Transition Government’s
efforts regarding
non-critical shelter and settlement issues. If required, possible
actions during the recovery phase could include the following:
• Continuing to work with local communities to ensure their
participation and voice in
conducting on-site, on-going needs assessments to provide an objective
basis for
determining the effectiveness of shelter interventions;
• Reviewing of national policy frameworks to identify any changes
required to ensure
long-term local community involvement in the planning and implementation
of
shelter and settlement interventions, and ensuring programs receive
sufficient
financial and human resource support from the Cuban Transition
Government; and
• Reviewing community-based hazard-mitigation and preparedness plans,
and
supporting revisions if necessary to promote “safer settlements.” These
plans could
include structural (e.g., hurricane straps) and non-structural
interventions (e.g.,
coastal zone management, floodplain management, hillside development
ordinances, and local land-use planning).
Protection of the Most Vulnerable Populations
“Protection” is a term applied to efforts to reduce physical, emotional,
and social
risks to a population, particularly vulnerable individuals and groups. A
Cuban Transition Government will face immediate pressures to provide
equal access to basic services, and to promote the rights and dignity of
individuals, families, groups, and communities. If requested to provide
assistance, the U.S. Government should ensure incorporation of
internationally recognized protection principles into all assistance
initiatives for the Cuban people. These principles could guarantee
meeting the needs of the most vulnerable, while providing a potent
example of respect for the dignity of all people.
The U.S. Government could do this in several ways:
• Incorporating protection into the design and implementation of
humanitarian
assistance programs to identify and support vulnerable populations to
reduce or
manage risks from violence, abuse, harassment, and exploitation;
• Assessing the needs of specific vulnerable populations, and
considering how to
provide assistance to ensure their needs are met, including by
reinforcing positive
coping mechanisms among individuals and communities; and
• Establishing information systems in the earliest stages of
humanitarian activities to
share timely and accurate information with the population, and between
assistance
providers.
If requested, the U.S. Government could support, along with other
partners, a Cuban
Transition Government’s adherence to protection principles, now and
during critical and
non-critical periods during the transition as follows:
• Ensuring protection principles are understood and adhered to by all
assistance sectors and organizations;
• Assessing affected populations, with special attention paid to
identifying vulnerable
individuals and groups and developing strategies to reinforce positive
coping
mechanisms and ensure basic services meet their needs;
• Developing a monitoring and reporting system to ensure assistance
reaches vulnerable populations and to identify and resolve protection
problems;
• Establishing a tracing system for separated families and supporting
reunification as
soon as possible. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
could also
provide useful assistance in this area;
• Ensuring the safety of public records and other official documents,
including land registry documents; and
• Establishing a public- information system via radio, TV, and other
means to reach the
broadest number of people.
Once critical protection needs are addressed, if requested, the U.S.
Government
could support, with other partners, a Cuban Transition Government’s
efforts during the
recovery phase to do the following:
• Developing more robust assessments, monitoring, and service-delivery
to vulnerable
populations;
• Resolving family reunification cases; and
• Providing individual identifications for those without, if necessary.
Educational Systems
Cuba’s educational system is based on the Soviet model of combining
education, physical labor, and political ideology to indoctrinate youth.
While Cuba reports one of Latin America’s best literacy rates,
children’s textbooks are ideologically skewed. Independent thought is
neither encouraged nor allowed. As part of their indoctrination,
adolescent students are sent away to poorly run work camps in the
countryside. Because of an exodus of seasoned educators to jobs in the
tourism industry, the Cuban educational system relies on teachers-
in-training, including 18-year-old high-school graduates. Parents are
increasingly expressing concern that these new teachers do not have
adequate training. As a result, the regime now prohibits trained
teachers from working in higher-paying, dollar based jobs.
If requested, the U.S. Government could help the Cuban Transition
Government
keep schools open, and help students, including vulnerable individuals,
remain in school during a transition.
The first step to meet this objective could be to conduct a field-based
needs
assessment of the Cuban education system’s infrastructure, staffing,
funding, and materials, plus Cuban libraries, in cooperation with Cuban
Transition authorities. A preliminary assessment within the first three
months could form the basis for longer-term assistance planning. This
assessment should include facilities currently used for instructional
purposes at all levels, as well as facilities shut down or converted by
the regime that might be returned to educational uses.
If needed and requested by the Cuban Transition Government, U.S.
Government
educational support, in coordination with other partners, could include
the following:
• Assisting the Cuban Transition Government in finding options for
vulnerable
populations if the transition creates problems of continuity with basic
services or
economic hardship deprives individuals from participating in education
activities;
• Organizing groups of volunteer teachers, from abroad and overseas
Cuban teacher
associations, such as National Association of Cuban American Educators
to help
support Cuban teachers; and
• Engaging donors, including Organization of American States (OAS)
countries, and
appropriate publishers to work with Cuban teachers to supply temporary
instructional materials to replace politicized materials withdrawn by
the Cuban
Transition Government.
During a recovery period, if requested and necessary, the U.S.
Government could
support the Cuban Transition Government’s efforts to coordinate with
international donors and assistance agencies, such as religious bodies,
private donors, civic groups, and the Cuban Transition Government to do
the following:
• Ensure educational facilities and services are available to as many of
the Cuban
people as possible; and
• Assist the Cuban transition educational system to remove legal,
social, and health
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