|
|
|
Documents
Commission for Assistance to a
Free Cuba.
July 2006
Report to the President
Condoleezza Rice
Secretary Of State
Chair
Carlos Gutierrez
Secretary Of Commerce
Co-Chair
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1: HASTENING THE END OF THE CASTRO DICTATORSHIP: TRANSITION NOT
SUCCESSION
I. Introduction
II. Determinations
III. Empowering the Cuban People
IV. Breaking the Regime’s Information Blockade
V. Undermining the Regime’s Succession Strategy
VI. Denying Revenue to the Castro Regime
CHAPTER 2: HELPING CUBANS RESPOND TO CRITICAL HUMANITARIAN AND SOCIAL
NEEDS
I. Introduction
II. Water and Sanitation
III. Health-Care and Nutrition
IV. Food Security
V. Shelter
VI. Protection of the Most Vulnerable Populations
VII. Educational Systems
CHAPTER 3: HELPING CUBANS GET TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS
I. Introduction
II. Release of Political Prisoners
III. Eliminating Legal Obstacles to Freedom of Speech, Freedom of the
Press and Freedom of Political Association
IV. Preparing for Competitive Multi-Party Elections And Democratic
Process
V. Support a Free and Independent Media
VI. Support for Free and Fair Election Administration
VII. Support for Professional, Institutional Military
CHAPTER 4: HELPING CUBANS CREATE MARKET-BASED ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES
I. Introduction
II. Macroeconomic Stability
III. Integration with the International Trade and Financial System
IV. Encourage Small Business Development
V. Ensuring Labor Rights are Respected
VI. Property Rights and Confiscated Property
VII. Agriculture
VIII. Infrastructure
IX. Issues for a Free Cuba
CHAPTER 5: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
I. Engaging the International Community in Helping Cubans Respond to
Critical Humanitarian and Social Needs
II. Engaging the International Community in Helping Cubans Get to Free
and Fair Elections
III. Engaging the International Community in Helping Cubans Create
Market-Based Economic Opportunities
CHAPTER 6: THE VITAL ROLE OF CUBANS ABROAD
I. Helping Cubans Respond to Humanitarian and Social Needs
II. Helping Cubans Get to Free and Fair Elections
III. Helping Cubans Create Market-Based Economic Opportunities
CHAPTER 7: PREPARING NOW TO SUPPORT THE TRANSITION
I. Essential Steps to Take Now
II. Steps to Take Now to Prepare to Help Cubans Respond to Critical
Humanitarian and Social Needs
III. Steps to Take Now to Prepare to Help Cubans Get to Free and Fair
Elections
IV. Steps to Take Now to Prepare to Help Cubans Create Market-Based
Economic Opportunities
V. Additional Recommended Action
HASTENING CHANGE IN CUBA: TRANSITION, NOT SUCCESSION
Since the publication of the 2004 Commission for Assistance to a Free
Cuba (CAFC) report, there have been important changes both on and off
the island that the Commission has weighed in making this new set of
recommendations. Today, we see in Cuba a more active civil society, one
energized by a growing sense of what is possible. At the same time,
there are clear signs the regime is using money provided by the Chavez
government in Venezuela to reactivate its networks in the hemisphere to
subvert democratic governments. The Castro regime’s international
meddling is done at the expense of the needs of the Cuban people. There
is a growing sense of frustration among ordinary Cubans with a
dictatorship that asks them to sacrifice, but expends considerable
resources in the far flung reaches of the hemisphere and beyond.
Cubans continue to be imprisoned for activities that Americans take for
granted each and every day: reading and viewing what they wish;
accessing information from the outside world, including the Internet;
meeting in their homes to discuss the future of their country; running a
lending library; or conducting petition drives. Despite the savage
campaign against them by the regime, the Cuban people are losing their
fear and continue to risk life, limb, livelihood, and imprisonment in
search of a better future for their families and their nation.
The Commission’s recommendations to hasten democratic change in Cuba
reflect recognition of the leadership and bravery of the Cuban people.
They also reflect the Commission’s view that the United States and other
friends of democracy should acknowledge and honor the courage of Cuban
democracy activists by supporting their efforts to recapture their
sovereignty for their fellow Cubans.
Yet at the same time that we see hope and growth in Cuban civil society,
Fidel Castro and his inner circle have begun a gradual but intrinsically
unstable process of succession. The regime is unquestionably attempting
to insulate itself from the consequences of Fidel Castro’s
incapacitation, death, or ouster. The regime continues to harden its
edges and is feverishly working to forestall any opportunity for a
genuine democratic transition on the island.
The current regime in Havana is working with like-minded governments,
particularly Venezuela, to build a network of political and financial
support designed to forestall any external pressure to change. This
state of affairs highlights the urgency of working today to ensure that
the Cuban transition is genuine and that the Castro regime’s succession
strategy does not succeed.
It is against this back-drop that the Commission for Assistance to a
Free Cuba again assembles and looks at the question of how to help the
Cuban people hasten and ensure a genuine democratic transition on the
island. This is a time for bold, decisive action and clarity of message.
Recommendations to hasten the end of the Castro dictatorship include:
measures to empower the Cuban people to prepare for change by
strengthening support to civil society; breaking the regime’s
information blockade; a diplomatic strategy to undermine the regime’s
succession strategy by supporting the Cuban people’s right to determine
their future; and measures to deny revenue to the Castro regime that is
used to strengthen its repressive security apparatus and to bolster the
regime against pressure for change.
HELPING CUBANS RESPOND TO
CRITICAL HUMANITARIAN AND SOCIAL NEEDS
The Castro regime is failing to address even the most basic humanitarian
needs of the Cuban people. Chronic malnutrition, polluted drinking
water, and untreated chronic diseases continue to affect a significant
percentage of the Cuban people. Conditions will not improve as long as
Fidel Castro remains in power.
With the end of the Castro regime, however, the Cuban Transition
Government will face daunting challenges as it begins to address the
basic human needs of the Cuban people. The Cuban people will expect
rapid and effective action by this new government.
The U.S. Government stands ready to help the Cuban Transition Government
begin to address the immediate water, sanitation, health, food, shelter
and education needs of the Cuban people. Helping the Cuban Transition
Government meet these basic needs is essential to a rapid and successful
transition period, the establishment of the new government’s
credibility, and timely democratic elections.
By providing assistance in these areas, the U.S. Government can help the
Cuban Transition Government guarantee political freedom, economic
opportunity, and hold free and fair multiparty elections.
HELPING CUBANS GET TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS
Cubans have the right to see their sovereign will expressed through free
and fair, multiparty elections. The transition to an open environment,
free of intimidation and other impediments, and sufficiently in advance
of elections to meet international standards, implies that a Cuban
Transition Government will need certain types of assistance from the
international community. The United States should be prepared to
respond. U.S. preparations should be structured to provide assistance
bilaterally but should also focus on building an international consensus
for assistance focused around supporting the process of rebuilding
democracy in Cuba.
A Cuban Transition Government cannot be expected to rectify, in a few
months, the consequences of decades of dictatorship. Accordingly, the
U.S. should encourage the Cuban Transition Government to focus on those
steps that will allow the election of a truly democratic, representative
government that can take on that historic challenge.
The principal purpose of any
U.S. assistance should be to help Cubans create a stable, open
environment where free and fair elections can take place. U.S.
assistance should be offered to help Cubans overcome obstacles to
democratic elections and move rapidly to create an environment conducive
to free and fair multiparty elections.
If requested by a new Cuban government, U.S. assistance could be made
available to help in the release of political prisoners; eliminating
obstacles to free speech, a free press, and freedom of association;
preparing for competitive multi-party elections; in establishing a free
and fair election administration; and in preparing the Cuban military
forces to adjust to an appropriate role in a democracy.
HELPING CUBANS CREATE MARKET-BASED ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES
The economic potential of the Cuban people has for too long been
suppressed, held hostage to a failed economic model that sustains the
regime but does nothing to bring prosperity to the people of Cuba. A
Cuban Transition Government will face significant pressure to take quick
action to increase economic opportunities and give the Cuban people hope
for an economic stake in the new system. Quick and visible economic
progress will give important legitimacy to the Cuban Transition
Government.
A Cuban Transition Government will face critical issues ranging from
stabilizing the Cuban macroeconomic condition to creating a
microeconomic framework that will allow private enterprise to grow. It
will confront a long history of poor labor relations and demands to
respect the rights of workers to form unions and bargain collectively.
It will need to ensure that its critical infrastructure is not only
adequately functioning, but on the road to recovery and keeping pace
with the demands of a growing, free economy.
In addition, other actors, including Cubans abroad, the international
community, and the U.S. Government, will have an important role to play
in responding to requests from the Cuban Transition Government for
support and advice. We need to prepare now to maximize the benefit each
of these actors can bring to the table at a key moment in Cuban history.
Should a Cuban Transition Government request United States assistance in
its economic transition, the U.S. Government can provide help in
establishing macroeconomic stability; reintegrating Cuba to the
international trade and financial systems; encouraging small business
development; ensuring labor rights are respected; stabilizing existing
Cuban agricultural capability and local markets; and improving
broad-based access to and accountability for sustainable essential
infrastructure.
THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY
The international community will be instrumental in assisting a Cuban
Transition Government that guarantees political freedom, economic
opportunity and holds free and fair elections. Support from the
international community will also help accelerate Cuba’s reintegration
into the world economy, bring useful experiences to bear from other
countries that have succeeded in transitions, and ease the humanitarian
and financial burden on the Cuban Transition Government. The United
States and its neighbors have committed to representative democracy as
the standard for the Inter-American system and have an obligation under
the Inter-American Democratic Charter to support and defend democracy
and all that it represents. These commitments will guide our approach to
a transitional Cuba.
If the Cuban Transition Government requests help, the U.S. Government
will work with international organizations, bilateral donors and
international and assistance organizations to ensure coordinated and
complimentary assistance in helping Cubans create market-based economic
opportunities; respond to critical humanitarian and social needs;
conduct free and fair elections; and, in helping prepare Cuba’s military
forces to adjust to an appropriate role in a democracy.
THE VITAL ROLE OF CUBANS ABROAD
As part of a broader effort by the international community, Cubans
around the world can play a crucial role in providing assistance in all
of the areas covered by this report to secure the success of the
transition to a Free Cuba. Cubans living abroad can provide much needed
resources in the form of information, research and know-how, as well as
material support, remittances, loans and investment capital. Reconciling
and reuniting the Cuban family in freedom will also be essential to the
successful, rapid return of sovereignty to the Cuban people.
The Commission strongly believes that the Cuban community abroad should
re-double their efforts to foster reconciliation on and off the island
and to undertake steps now to organize and prepare to assist a
Transition Government in Cuba. In addition, the U.S. Government should
work with the Cuban community to ensure that their support to the
transition, and the planning for it, is coordinated in a way that is
consistent with overall reconstruction efforts.
PREPARING NOW TO SUPPORT THE
TRANSITION
With this report, the Commission continues an ongoing planning and
coordination process to hasten democracy in Cuba and institutionalizes
ongoing planning to support, if requested, a Cuban Transition Government
that guarantees political freedom, economic opportunity, and holds free
and fair multiparty elections.
This is an ongoing process to accompany Cubans in their transition to
freedom. We will need to update and adapt our preparations to keep pace
with Cubans themselves. This will ensure that, when asked, we will be
able to offer appropriate support that meets needs identified by Cubans.
The U.S. Government will need to be prepared well in advance to help in
the event assistance is requested by the Cuban Transition Government.
U.S. preparations should be structured so that assistance can be offered
immediately to the Cuban Transition Government bilaterally as necessary
and then folded into a broader international effort as that develops.
In establishing a strong foundation on which to build, the first six
months of any requested U.S. assistance program is of paramount
importance. This critical 180-day period could mean the difference
between a successful transition and the stumbles and missteps that
slowed other states as they moved toward democracy.
In addition to the steps recommended by the Commission to help hasten
the transition, several steps can be taken to ensure broad-based
involvement of the U.S. Government, international partners and
organizations, as well as our own civil society and private sector. The
Commission makes a number of practical recommendations that the United
States can implement today in preparation for the inevitable transition.
These include the areas of government organization; electoral
preparation; and anticipating critical humanitarian and social needs.
INTRODUCTION
This second report to the President from the Commission for Assistance
to a Free Cuba continues and builds upon the recommendations implemented
through the Commission’s first report submitted in May 2004. This report
contains seven chapters and a series of recommendations, consistent with
U.S. law, designed to help Cubans secure real and lasting change in
their country. It recommends that the United States be prepared to offer
prioritized assistance to a Cuban transition government that moves
rapidly to free and fair, multiparty elections.
This report broadly summarizes resources and expertise the U.S.
Government could make available, in accordance with U.S. law, should a
Cuban Transition Government committed to free and fair elections ask for
our help. This report seeks to unify U.S. Government efforts under a
strategic goal to help manage and coordinate ongoing efforts to plan for
Cuba’s transition. It also recognizes that the international community
and Cubans abroad will have an important role to play in Cuba’s
transition. This document represents the work of over 100 participants
from seventeen federal departments and agencies over the course of
several months.
As long as the regime abuses the people of Cuba our policy will remain
firm. Implementing the Commission’s recommendations for hastening a
transition has helped break the regime’s information blockade on Cubans
and is denying resources that the regime would otherwise use to repress
its citizens. This report’s recommendations for helping hasten the
transition are centered on a substantial increase in our efforts, in
concert with other nations, to empower Cubans to define a democratic
future for their country.
In keeping with the first Commission report, this document sets forth
specific assistance and programs the United States can offer to help
Cubans quickly recover their sovereignty through free and fair
multiparty elections. This report was developed on the basis of U.S. law
and we recommend that implementation be done with due regard for
international law and treaty obligations, internationally recognized
human rights, and democratic principles. It reflects the commitment we
and the other nations of the Western Hemisphere made in the
Inter-American Democratic Charter to the promotion and defense of
democracy.
The prospective recommendations and proposals in this report are not
prescriptions or dictates. They only become possible when the President
determines that there is a transition government in place and they only
remain possible if that government continues to work toward free and
fair multiparty elections. In implementing this assistance, we will need
to ensure that we are reinforcing a process of democratic change and not
reinforcing anti-democratic regime elements.
The existence of the
Commission and the recommendations in this report provide a formal
process within the United States government to support the freedom
movement in Cuba today and to take actions now to develop appropriate
plans to support a democratic transition tomorrow. The U.S. Government,
at the highest levels, is engaged in this effort.
This is an ongoing process to accompany Cubans in their transition to
freedom. We will need to update and adapt our preparations to keep pace
with Cubans themselves. This will ensure that, when asked, we will be
able to offer appropriate support that meets needs identified by Cubans.
The American people understand and support the aspirations of people all
over the world, including Cubans, to live in freedom. Americans have not
only opened their hearts but also our shores to the Cuban people. We are
confident that a free and prosperous Cuba will once again be a friend to
the United States.
The Cuban dictatorship remains a danger, especially to its own people,
even in its twilight. It still seeks to frustrate democratic governance
in the region and to actively undermine United States interests. Cubans
endure the grim reality of life in their country. Living under a
dictatorship means a daily struggle to satisfy needs and wants, with
immorality, and, above all, with hopelessness.
Cubans need to know there is hope in freedom. Accordingly, we cannot
falter or fail to support the Cuban people as they approach the
opportunity for real change. When the time comes, the generosity
Americans have always extended to Cubans will surely be redoubled.
With the horizon marking the end of the long struggle against tyranny in
Cuba approaching, the Commission’s fundamental premise is that Cubans
themselves will define their own destiny. Only Cubans can chart a path
to liberty, prosperity, and reconciliation. It is they who will ensure
that the dictatorship which advocated nuclear war against our nation
will end.
Cubans in Cuba, at great
personal risk, are already talking about a democratic transition for
their country. It is what Cubans say about the future of Cuba that truly
matters. The civic opposition movement is creating momentum for
democratic change in Cuba. With our offer of support, advice, and help
to all who seek democratic change in Cuba, we hope to add to this
momentum and to keep pace with the Cuban people as they press for
democratic change.
Continued dictatorship will result in neither stability nor opportunity
in Cuba. The world’s democracies can work together now to support the
right of Cubans to define a democratic future for their country. Just as
Cubans will face an inevitable opportunity for change, the international
community will face a choice. Half measures and partial reforms by an
unelected successor regime short of free and fair elections should not
be rewarded with recognition or support from the free nations of the
world.
As a community of free nations, we can intensify our efforts now to help
Cubans who support liberty, prosperity, and reconciliation. We hope this
report will find resonance with the people of Cuba, the world’s
democracies, and the people of the United States. Together, we can
reassure the Cuban people that they can count on democratic allies as
they move to see their sovereign will expressed through free and fair,
multiparty elections.
CHAPTER 1: HASTENING THE END OF THE CASTRO DICTATORSHIP: TRANSITION NOT
SUCCESSION
This is an unclassified report. For reasons of national security and
effective implementation, some recommendations are contained in a
separate classified annex.
Three years ago, the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba began the
most significant review of U.S. policy toward Cuba in decades,
developing a specific set of recommendations focused on hastening a
democratic transition in Cuba. The 2004 CAFC report identified the
"survival strategies" of the Castro regime and its cynical manipulation
of United States humanitarian policies and examined its relentless
pursuit of hard currency to maintain its repression of the Cuban people
and their aspirations for freedom. Recommendations designed to limit the
regime’s access to hard currency were implemented and have subsequently
helped to restrict the funds available to the regime to sustain itself
in power.
The 2004 report made the case for offering more direct U.S. support to
Cubans on the island who advocate real change and for breaking down the
information blockade erected by the regime across the island. The
Commission has re-affirmed the direction taken in the 2004 report as a
solid foundation upon which to make additional recommendations designed
to hasten and consolidate a democratic transition in Cuba.
Since the publication of the
2004 report, there have been important changes both on and off the
island that the Commission has weighed in making this new set of
recommendations. Today, we see in Cuba a more active civil society, one
energized by a growing sense of what is possible.
At the same time, there are clear signs the regime is using money
provided by the Chavez government in Venezuela to reactivate its
networks in the hemisphere to subvert democratic governments. The Castro
regime’s international meddling is done at the expense of the needs of
the Cuban people. There is a growing sense of frustration among ordinary
Cubans with a dictatorship that asks them to sacrifice, but expends
considerable resources in the far flung reaches of the hemisphere and
beyond.
Cubans continue to be imprisoned for activities that Americans take for
granted each and every day: reading and viewing what they wish;
accessing information from the outside world, including the Internet;
meeting in their homes to discuss the future of their country; running a
lending library; or conducting petition drives. Despite the savage
campaign against them by the regime, the Cuban people are losing their
fear and continue to risk life, limb, livelihood, and physical freedom
in search of a better future for their nation.
The Commission’s recommendations reflect recognition of the leadership
and bravery of the Cuban people. They also reflect the Commission’s view
that the United States and other friends of democracy should acknowledge
and honor the courage of Cuban democracy activists by supporting them as
they work to secure the rapid return of sovereignty to the people of
their nation.
Yet, at the same time that we see hope and growth in Cuban civil
society, we also know that Fidel Castro and his inner circle are engaged
in an effort to ensure a succession within the revolution. The regime is
attempting to insulate itself from the consequences of Fidel Castro’s
incapacitation, death, or ouster. The regime continues to harden its
edges and is feverishly working to forestall any opportunity for a
genuine democratic transition on the island by putting hardliners into
key positions and rolling back even minimal economic openings. And, as
noted above, the repressive instruments of the regime are working
assiduously to stamp out civil society initiatives, but without success.
The current regime in Havana is working with like-minded governments,
particularly Venezuela, to build a network of political and financial
support designed to forestall any external pressure to change. This
state of affairs highlights the urgency of working today to ensure that
the Cuban transition is genuine and that the Castro regime’s succession
strategy does not succeed.
It is against this back-drop that the Commission for Assistance to a
Free Cuba again assembles and looks at the question of how to help the
Cuban people hasten and ensure a genuine transition on the island. This
is a time for bold, decisive action and clarity of message.
DETERMINATIONS
In order to lead genuine change, the Cuban people must have hope for a
better future in a Free Cuba.
Our goal is to support the growing consensus for democracy in Cuba
itself. A perpetuation of the status quo in Cuba through a succession
among the current ruling elites would be a tragedy for the Cuban people.
They have endured decades of dictatorship and deserve to regain their
sovereignty and chart a new course for their country.
It is the Cuban people on the island who will chart the course of their
future. They are increasingly active and brave in the face of the
regime’s brutality; they deserve U.S. and international support, both
through creative, well-funded programs designed to empower them, and
through diplomatic efforts to help build an international consensus
around action to promote a genuine democratic transition in Cuba.
The greatest guarantor of genuine stability in Cuba is the rapid
restoration of sovereignty to the Cuban people through free and fair,
multiparty elections. The notion that the consolidation of continued
dictatorship under Raul Castro or other undemocratic successors will
lead to stability is an illusion.
There should be no misunderstanding: the Cuban dictatorship today is a
destabilizing force in the region; a demonstrated threat to our citizens
and their own; and has proven willing to manipulate for its own
self-serving purposes humanitarian U.S. immigration policies and the
desire of the Cuban people for freedom.
U.S. policymakers need to understand and address the fact that there are
"spoilers" in the international community who seek to accommodate or
otherwise support the Cuban dictatorship’s succession strategy at the
expense of a democratic Cuban transition and U.S. national interests.
If the Cuban people are to succeed when the inevitable opportunity for
change occurs, the United States must support their democratic
aspirations by informing the international community of the historic
nature of the choice they must make about whether or not to support a
genuine transition in Cuba. Our top diplomatic objective must be to
build an international consensus around an understanding that the Cuban
people have a right to determine their future and that their sovereignty
should be returned to them.
The democracies of the Western
Hemisphere should take a leading role in guiding Cuba on a path that
leads to representative democracy. The mileposts along that path are the
benchmarks set forth in the Inter-American Democratic Charter.
We must help the Cuban people define an alternative future for
themselves – one where Cubans can live in peace, justice prevails, and
alternative views are respected.
We need to help reassure Cubans on the island who seek to preserve the
status quo out of fear of what lies beyond the end of the dictatorship.
We must also advance an alternative view of the future for Cubans
currently in the regime who support democratic change. They need to know
that they and their families will also have a future in a Free Cuba. It
is only Castro’s "esbirros" (henchmen) who need to fear justice.
For all Cubans, we must underscore that the future is theirs to define
and that the U.S. and our citizens pose no threat to their security or
their homes. We must also be clear that there is but one Cuban people
and that reconciliation will be essential to securing a Free Cuba.
EMPOWERING THE CUBAN PEOPLE
Since 1952, Cubans have lived under a succession of dictators, first
under Fulgencio Batista, and then Batista’s totalitarian successor,
Fidel Castro. Until recently, the Castro dictatorship had been able to
maintain its grip on the Cuban people by repressing the development of
independent civil society and keeping the Cuban people on a desperate
hunt for dollars and basic necessities, thereby preventing the emergence
of a viable alternative to its failed policies. By promoting fear about
the future and distrust amongst each other, the regime has sought to
keep civil society stunted and the Cuban people under its control.
That control is increasingly being degraded by a Cuban society fed up
with broken promises and the failure of the regime to meet its basic
needs. Growing popular discontent, the failure of regime-sponsored Actos
de Repudio to intimidate the opposition, and increasing negative
international opinion have weakened the regime and placed it on the
defensive. There now is a growing consensus among the Cuban people on
the need for democracy.
Offering to help Cubans meet their basic and unmet social desires and
humanitarian needs will be a powerful force for change and the best
guarantor that the transition to freedom will succeed in rapidly
restoring sovereignty to the Cuban people through free, multi-party
elections. Cubans can better face the uncertainty of change if they are
reassured that their basic humanitarian needs will be met.
The Rising Cuban Democratic Opposition
The last several years have witnessed a sustained increase in the
ability of the Cuban opposition to engage in acts of resistance,
mobilize greater segments of the Cuban population, and communicate a
positive vision for the future to the Cuban people and the international
community.
At the grassroots level, youth, women, and Afro-Cubans are key
constituencies for the continued growth of Cuba’s civil society
movement. More than half of Cuba’s population is under age 35 and has
the weakest attachment to the Castro revolution and the strongest desire
for real change. Afro-Cubans and mixed-ethnicity Cubans comprise 62
percent of the population and are increasingly aware of their gross
under-representation in leadership positions. They continue to be
socially marginalized by the regime elite, and Afro-Cuban youths are a
consistent target of police harassment, intimidation, arrest, and
expulsion out of Havana and other parts of Cuba. Castro’s Cuba has
become a major sex tourism destination and is a source country for women
and children trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation.
Despite Castro’s efforts to
repress and intimidate, the opposition has made great strides in
mobilizing these groups. Women and Afro-Cubans are at the forefront of
the opposition which includes Martha Beatriz Roque of the Assembly to
Promote Civil Society; imprisoned activists such as Dr. Oscar Elias
Biscet; the scores of organizers of Oswaldo Paya’s Varela Project; and
independent journalists such as Guillermo Fariñas, who is engaged in a
sustained hunger strike for uncensored access to the Internet for
ordinary Cubans. The Damas de Blanco, the mothers and wives of the 75
activists imprisoned during the regime’s March 2003 crackdown on the
peaceful opposition, remain a powerful and visible domestic and
international symbol of the current struggle for freedom and democracy
in Cuba and a focal point for non-violent resistance efforts.
Significant challenges remain, however, before the democratic opposition
and civic movement can move beyond protest and non-cooperation with the
regime and become the catalysts for and implementers of a sea change
within Cuba. Above all, the civic movement needs additional support to
present to their fellow Cubans a viable alternative to the failed
policies of the Castro regime. The experience of East European civic
movements in organizing resistance that ended repressive dictatorships,
and then in assuming leadership that led to freedom, prosperity, and
reconciliation in their respective countries, could be particularly
helpful for Cuba’s developing opposition movement. In addition, if
requested, civil society groups could benefit from greater training to
prepare to help lead a democratic transition and future government in
Cuba.
It is critical that independent Cuban civil society groups continue to
gain greater access to basic modern equipment to help expand
distribution of independent information and facilitate pro-democracy
activities. Continued access to these types of equipment help Cuba’s
civil society disseminate information to the Cuban people and counter
regime efforts to maintain its grip on the Cuban people through
exclusive control over all forms of communication.
In particular, the Cuban people, and especially the civic opposition
movement, need access to the Internet. Currently, the Castro regime
strictly controls all access to the Internet, limiting access to a few
websites to hand-picked regime supporters and foreigners at specially
identified internet cafes, which are out of the reach of the average
Cuban.
Recommendations:
Recommendations include the following:
Cuba Fund for a Democratic Future
To empower the Cuban people and the Cuban democratic opposition to take
advantage of these new opportunities, the Commission recommends the Cuba
Fund for a Democratic Future: $80 million over two years to increase
support for Cuban civil society, expand international awareness, break
the regime’s information blockade, and continue developing assistance
initiatives to help Cuban civil society realize a democratic transition.
The Commission also recommends consistent yearly funding of Cuba
democracy programs at no less than $20 million on an annual basis
thereafter until the dictatorship ceases to exist.
This fund should include:
Support to independent civil society on the island ($31 million);
Funding for education and exchanges, including on-island university
training from third countries and scholarships for economically
disadvantaged students from Cuba identified by independent
non-governmental entities and civic organizations at U.S. and third
country universities (including historically-black and faith-based
institutions) ($10 million);
Efforts to break the Castro regime’s information blockade and expand the
Cuban people’s access to independent information, including through the
Internet ($24 million); and
Support for international efforts at strengthening civil society and in
transition planning ($15 million).
IV. BREAK THE REGIME’S INFORMATION BLOCKADE
The Castro regime continues to control all means of mass media and
communication on the island. The regime exerts absolute control over
newspapers, radio, and television through a pervasive system of
repression, intimidation, seizures of equipment, and arrest. The regime
fears the day that the Cuban people have full access to independent
information. The lack of access to independent information enables the
government to maintain a climate of fear of repression and fear of
change across the island necessary to its continued survival.
The recommendations of CAFC I to break the information blockade have
been successful in getting a greater flow of information to the Cuban
people than ever before. Broadcasts of Radio and TV Marti from an
airborne platform have reached Cubans across the island in unprecedented
numbers and have overcome the ability of the Cuban regime to jam and
disrupt broadcast signals. The expanded distribution of media, including
newsletters and videos, and equipment have empowered even greater
numbers of the Cuban people to obtain reliable information on events in
Cuba and on alternatives to the failed policies of the Castro regime.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Selected recommendations include the following:
In conjunction with the recommended measures to strengthen civil society
and international solidarity with the Cuban democratic opposition, the
Commission recommends measures to intensify efforts to break the
regime’s information blockade and aid the Cuban people in the ongoing
transition:
Broadcasting
Advances in the development of new and improved technologies make it
increasingly possible to expand broadcasts of reliable information to
the Cuban people and to equip them to receive and disseminate such
information across the island. The Commission recommends the following
measures be taken to expand on the work already underway by U.S.
broadcasting entities in support of Cuban civil society:
Fund the transmission of TV
Marti via Satellite TV into Cuba by the most effective means possible;
Within 90 days conduct a comprehensive and independent review on ways to
improve Cuba broadcasts;
Fund civil society groups to provide equipment to receive international
broadcasts and independent media on the island to the Cuban people;
Expand use of third-country broadcasting into Cuba;
Replicate the successes of other U.S. broadcast programming in
developing a larger audience, by developing non-traditional programs
addressed to Cuban youth;
Support the training and equipping of independent print, radio, and TV
journalists in Cuba and improve their capacity and capability to inform
the world and the Cuban people of events in Cuba; and
In connection with and/or as part of the strategic communication plan,
establish quarterly meetings between appropriate U.S. Government
agencies to coordinate strategy on broadcasting and communications to
the Cuban people.
IV. UNDERMINING THE REGIME’S SUCCESSION STRATEGY
Diplomacy and information must be employed to create momentum for
genuine change in order to undermine the regime’s succession strategy.
There should be no misunderstanding: the Castro brothers’ dictatorship
has every intention of continuing its stranglehold on power in Cuba,
regardless of the cost to or the will of the Cuban people. Just as Fidel
Castro replaced Batista in 1959, Cuba’s current dictator wants to impose
his brother on the Cuban people. The regime’s goal is to pass power from
Fidel Castro to his selected successor, Raul Castro, and the ruling
elite around him. Regime loyalists are relentlessly pursuing a strategy
whereby the international community will recognize and work with a
successor regime, regardless of whether or not the dictatorship has been
dismantled. In furtherance of this goal, the regime is actively
strengthening its repressive apparatus, re-consolidating its absolute
control over all political, social and economic aspects of Cuban
society, and using Venezuelan money to acquire international support and
legitimacy.
The Castro regime is actively seeking to control the policy environment
on transition in concert with opponents of peaceful, democratic change,
led by the Chavez government in Venezuela. The regime is implementing
information and influence campaigns to develop support networks outside
of Cuba to provide it additional revenue streams today, to act as
advocates on its behalf against U.S. policy toward Cuba and the region,
and to support and secure international legitimacy for a succession
within the revolution. These networks undermine the opportunity for a
democratic future for Cuba; U.S. national security interests in Cuba and
in third countries; and our interest in a democratic and stable
Venezuela.
The regime will seek to create domestic and international pressure on
the U.S. Government to unilaterally change our Cuba policy and establish
a new relationship with the regime regardless of whether or not the
dictatorship has been dismantled or the economy freed.
Fidel Castro senses his own mortality and the mortality of the
economically bankrupt regime he leads. He works relentlessly to hold it
together through a mix of political alliances, bartering and debt
extensions, and savage denial of political and economic freedoms to the
Cuban people. Today, he and his inner circle are implementing a
succession strategy designed to ensure the survival of the regime beyond
his own incapacitation, death, or ouster.
Cuba’s ever-deepening relationship with Venezuela parallels the earlier
failed relationship with the Soviet Union, only this time not as the
junior partner: Fidel Castro is calling the shots.
This Castro-led axis must be understood as part of the regime’s
succession strategy and an effort to insulate Cuba from pressure for
democratic change. This axis is designed to secure energy and financial
resources and create an external support network to help ensure the
regime is insulated.
This axis also undermines our interest in a more democratic Venezuela
and undermines democratic governance and institutions elsewhere in the
region. Together, these countries are advancing an alternative
retrograde and anti-American agenda for the hemisphere’s future and they
are finding some resonance with populist governments and disenfranchised
populations in the region. Castro hopes a political shift in the region
will be his legacy and offer a measure of protection for his "esbirros"
and opportunists in the Cuban Communist Party upon his departure from
power.
The weak flank of the Cuba-Venezuela axis is Cuba itself. Unlike
"Bolivarian" President Hugo Chavez, the Castro regime lacks even the
patina of electoral legitimacy. History will remember that Castro always
avoided the verdict of the Cuban people. Castro today must worry about
the growing frustration of the Cuban population about the failings of
the revolution and with expenditures in far-flung reaches of the world
when their needs are unmet at home. There are signs the axis with
Venezuela is beginning to grate on Cuban nationalist sensibilities. The
more than 11 million people in Cuba are, in fact, our natural allies in
breaking both the dictatorship and the Cuba-Venezuela axis that protects
and sustains it.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Selected recommendations include the following:
The Commission recommends that Cuba, specifically Cuba’s impending
transition, continue to have a high profile in public messages and
statements by U.S. officials to build a sense of momentum for change.
The Commission is also recommending a diplomatic strategy to
consistently advance our view that there is an opportunity for
transition if we act today; that the Cuban people are more active than
ever despite intense pressure from the regime; and that we need to
commit to defending the right of the Cuban people to define their own
future;
In making a recommendation that a suspension of Title III of the 1996
Cuban Liberty and Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act for an individual country is
necessary to the national interest and will expedite a transition to
democracy in Cuba, consider in particular whether it is engaged in a
process of support for regime succession;
Vigorously enforce Title IV of the Libertad Act; particularly focusing
enforcement action on traffickers involved in strategic industries such
as oil, tourism, nickel, tobacco, and rum which finance Cuba's
repressive apparatus; and
Encourage Cuban workers in tourism, mining, and other sectors who work
for foreign companies to keep complete wage records.
A Diplomatic Campaign: Underscore Regime Illegitimacy and Build Support
for Transition
While differences of opinion about U.S. embargo policy persist, an
increasing number of countries share the view that there must be change
in Cuba and that the Cuban people should have the right to decide their
future. Since the March 2003 crackdown on pro-democracy forces, the
ongoing rollback of freedoms, and growing use of Actos de Repudio to
intimidate Cuban society, many now publicly condemn the regime’s abuses.
Political and civic leaders and organizations across Europe and Latin
America that once struggled for freedom in their own countries are
expanding outreach to the Cuban people and directly assisting
pro-democratic forces in their quest for freedom and respect for basic
human rights.
If the Cuban people are to succeed in their struggle to regain their
freedom and sovereignty, the international community must increase their
engagement with and support to Cuban civil society. There should be full
agreement that the only acceptable result of Fidel Castro’s
incapacitation, death, or ouster is for a genuine democratic transition
to take place in Cuba. This is an historic and stark choice between the
continuation of dictatorship or the restoration of freedom and
sovereignty to eleven million men, women, and children.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Selected recommendations include the following:
Recognizing the need to solidify international consensus around the
right of the Cuban people to determine their democratic future, and
promote greater direct involvement by third-countries in Cuba, we
recommend the implementation of a diplomatic campaign to include:
Encourage convergence of goals and efforts by other democratic nations
to support a democratic transition in Cuba with our own efforts,
including transition planning exercises, and encouraging bilateral
engagement between European nations and Western Hemisphere democracies
on a Cuban transition;
Build a coalition of countries to support a democratic transition in
Cuba now and at a moment of change on the island;
Work diplomatically with the OAS and its member states to ensure that
adherence to the Inter-American Democratic Charter is the standard for
Cuba’s reintegration in the inter-American system, in keeping with the
Declaration of Florida adopted at the XXXV OAS General Assembly;
Expand support for third-country efforts to promote the development of
Cuban civil society and pro-democracy groups on the island;
Encourage democratic governments, especially Community of Democracies
participants from the Western Hemisphere and Europe, to invite leaders
of the democratic opposition to their countries for meetings with
government officials and civic society leaders;
Draw a distinction between countries that support succession (such as
Venezuela and Iran) and countries that support the right of the Cuban
people to debate and define a democratic future for Cuba;
Invigorate examination of Cuban abuses at international organizations:
Encourage presentation of cases to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights on behalf of victims of government sponsored mob attacks
known as Actos de Repudio; and
Encourage other nations to address Cuban labor violations at the ILO.
IDENTIFY AND TARGET HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS
As part of U.S. policy aimed at undermining the regime’s succession
strategy, we must accelerate the process of stripping away layers of
support within the regime by creating additional uncertainty regarding
the political and legal future of those in leadership positions.
We explicitly reject the notion of "witch hunts" in a democratic Cuba
against those in government positions. However, Cubans at all levels of
the government must understand that those currently in leadership
positions who have engaged in or misused their positions to perpetrate
human rights abuses will be duly noted and appropriately sanctioned by
the U.S. Government as authorized by U.S. law, where applicable.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Selected recommendations include the following:
Lista de Esbirros: Place the names of those credibly believed to be
involved in orchestrating human rights abuses in Cuba into the Abuse
Case Evaluation System (ACES) database that is currently maintained and
managed by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor at the State
Department;
Place the names of individuals involved in the 2003 and subsequent
trials of opposition activists, as well as those involved in
orchestrating Actos de Repudio, on the visa lookout database;
Amend Presidential Proclamation 5377 to permit the denial of immigrant,
as well as non-immigrant visas, to officers and employees of the
Government of Cuba or the Communist Party of Cuba;
Authorize denial of the right to adjust status to legal permanent alien
to any regime official when such an act would be detrimental to the
interests of the United States; and,
Submit the names of officials indicted for the murder of the
"Brothers-to-the-Rescue" pilots to Interpol.
MAKING MIGRATION SAFE, ORDERLY, AND A FORCE FOR CHANGE IN CUBA
The Cuban government has failed to honor its commitments under the
September 9, 1994, Joint Communiqué and the May 2, 1995, Joint
Statement, otherwise known as the "Migration Accords." While the 1994
Joint Communiqué obligates Cuba to take measures to ensure that
migration is safe, legal, and orderly, the Cuban government continues to
deny U.S. officials permission to monitor returned migrants outside of
Havana; facilitates the departure of thousands of Cubans annually over
the land borders into the U.S. via Mexico; deny exit permits to
otherwise qualified Cuban citizens, making some people wait for years to
emigrate; and flatly prohibit others from emigrating, including doctors
and family members of government officials.
The regime has also enacted a series of other bureaucratic measures that
impede the U.S. Interests Section’s efforts to meet the U.S. commitments
under the Agreement. As detailed in CAFC I, with these and other
mechanisms, the Castro regime continues to manipulate migration flows to
the United States. The regime does so to further its policies of
generating additional hard currency and as a means to control its
population — releasing pressure when necessary by permitting more exits.
The regime further seeks to dampen the efforts of Cuban activists
working for change by withholding exit permission to attend
international conferences or receive awards.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Selected recommendations include:
In response to Cuba’s repeated and consistent efforts to impede safe,
legal, and orderly migration, we recommend a series of diplomatic
efforts to notify the Castro regime of its failure to meet its
obligations under the Migration Accords and protesting its efforts to
interfere with and disrupt U.S. migration policy.
VI. DENYING REVENUE TO THE CASTRO REGIME
The policies of the Castro regime continue to debilitate the Cuban
economy, impoverish the Cuban people, and isolate Cuba from economic
advances enjoyed by the rest of the Western Hemisphere. The regime
ignores its obligations to its people and diverts its resources to
maintain its grip on power, manage a succession of the regime, and
destabilize democracies elsewhere in the Hemisphere. The more
financially stressed the system is, the more difficult it will be for
any leader who follows Fidel Castro to preside over a succession within
the dictatorship
The first report of the Commission recommended, and the President
directed be implemented, a comprehensive set of measures to deny the
Castro regime the revenues it needs to maintain its repressive security
apparatus. By the regime’s own admission, these measures — and continued
enforcement actions — have sharply cut licensed and unlicensed travel to
the island each year since the implementation of the measures of the
first report.
Limitations on travel, parcel deliveries and remittances have sharply
curtailed the regime’s manipulation of and profiteering from U.S.
humanitarian policies. These measures have been successful and should
continue to be implemented.
In order to undermine the regime’s succession strategy, it is critical
that the U.S. Government maintain economic pressure on the regime to
limit its ability to sustain itself and repress the Cuban people.
Moreover, as we rapidly approach the transitional moment, the more
economic pressure there is on the regime, the greater the likelihood
there will be dramatic and successful change for the Cuban people.
Improved Enforcement
The Castro regime continues to seek new and additional ways to raise
desperately needed hard currency by encouraging and facilitating
unlicensed cash flows and travel from the United States to Cuba. The
profits from these transactions continue to be critical for the
maintenance of the regime’s repressive security apparatus. The regime
has facilitated the establishment of third-country travel and remittance
companies whose primary purpose is to facilitate unlicensed transactions
from the United States and to help individuals evade U.S. restrictions
on such transactions. Similarly, in the last several years we have
witnessed a surge in attempts to abuse existing license categories to
engage in non-permissible activities, such as tourism or other
non-licensable visits.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Selected recommendations include:
Establish an inter-agency Law Enforcement Task Force for better
enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions on the Castro regime; and
Issue a directive to law enforcement agencies to pursue criminal
investigations, including prosecution, where possible and appropriate,
of Cuban Assets Control Regulation and other violations, especially for
those found to have been involved in organizing or facilitating
unlicensed travel transactions with Cuba.
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Regulations:
Prohibit individuals who wish to send remittances from going directly to
third-country institutions to send such remittances to Cuba and require
instead that all remittances be sent through licensed U.S. remittance
forwarders. Eliminate the use of cash-card services for licensed travel
to Cuba;
Expand the list of regime officials and agencies which are not permitted
to receive licensed remittances, and ensure that those included in the "Lista
de Esbirros" do not benefit from U.S. humanitarian policies by including
them on the list of Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) and by barring
SDNs from receiving remittances;
Implement new licensing criteria and reporting requirements for travel
service providers (TSPs) and Carrier Service Providers (CSPs), including
a requirement that TSPs and CSPs have an independent financial audit
conducted annually; and
Expand the use of Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) to designate
companies, including front companies, engaged in efforts to promote the
sale of Cuban goods or unlicensed travel, remittances, and other
transactions from the United States to Cuba.
U.S. Department of Commerce Regulations:
Revise temporary sojourn license (TSL) regulations and implementing
guidelines to ensure that licenses are not issued to maritime vessels,
unless the vessel is solely registered to transport goods and is engaged
in the regular transport of bulk commodities, or unless otherwise
consistent with the foreign policy interests of the United States;
Revise regulations and implementing guidelines to deny export licenses,
consistent with U.S. law, for discretionary, cosmetic, or other medical
equipment sales that would be destined to be used in large-scale medical
programs that cater to tourists and foreign patients and not exclusively
for the benefit and care of the Cuban people;
Develop effective monitoring and certification requirements for medical
equipment exports that ensure that these exports are used only for the
use and benefit of the Cuban people and not diverted to tourist or
foreign care institutions;
Ensure monitoring for medical
equipment is undertaken for the life of the product to ensure items
exported are at intended end-use institutions. In the event that the
Cuban government does not permit on-site monitoring at certain
institutions, future exports will not be authorized to such locations;
Reaffirm the U.S. Government’s export license policy of a strict general
policy of denial of Commerce export licenses, unless otherwise required
by existing law; and
Tighten regulations for the export of humanitarian items, other than
agricultural or medical commodities, to ensure that exports are
consigned to entities that support independent civil society and are not
regime administered or controlled organizations, such as the Cuban
Council of Churches.
Target Regime Foreign Income and Assets Abroad
Following the reductions in regime revenue as a result of the first
Commission report, nearly half of the regimes’ current foreign income is
now derived from nickel exports. The revenue from these sales does not
go to benefit the Cuban people, but is diverted to maintain the regime’s
repressive security apparatus and fund Castro’s interventionist and
destabilizing policies in other countries in the Hemisphere. Moreover,
some of this revenue is derived from assets illegally expropriated from
U.S. citizens after Castro came to power. In addition, there are growing
indications of senior elements of the regime, engaging in efforts to
hide personal financial assets abroad to guard against a severe
disruption in their stations in the event of a democratic transition in
Cuba. These assets, including property and bank accounts, rightfully
belong to the Cuban people and should be tracked down and returned to
Cuba for the benefit of a Free Cuba.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
To hasten the end of the Castro regime by disrupting the regime’s
sources of foreign income and identifying regime assets abroad, we
recommend the U.S. Government:
Establish an inter-agency Cuban Nickel Targeting Task Force to
reinvigorate the existing nickel import certification and control regime
and analogous cobalt import control regime, consistent with our domestic
and international obligations.
Invigorate identification and targeting of regime offshore finances and
assets and initiate a diplomatic effort to engage international partners
and organizations to assist in developing information on and targeting
regime assets abroad.
Reconvene Cuban Assets Targeting Group with the task of identifying
additional ways to target and disrupt regime foreign income, including
identification of the assets of regime officials abroad, development of
information on official corruption and associated assets abroad.
CHAPTER 2: HELPING CUBANS RESPOND TO CRITICAL HUMANITARIAN AND SOCIAL
NEEDS
Introduction
The Castro regime trumpets "the achievements of the Revolution" in
meeting the basic needs of the Cuban people. In truth, the entire system
has been constructed for the sustenance of the regime, not to serve the
Cuban people or to allow for development and economic growth. With the
sudden withdrawal of massive Soviet subsidies in the early 1990’s, the
regime found it almost impossible to maintain the mythology of the
revolution’s achievements. Today, Cubans live with the consequences of
the regime’s deliberate decision to sustain itself at the expense of its
people: declining food stocks, increasing water shortages, crumbling
medical infrastructure, the disappearance of basic medicines, and
devastated housing stock. Although the regime continues to manipulate
health and other statistics and restricts access to its medical
facilities for people who might tell the real story of the revolution’s
failure to meet the needs of the Cuban people, it is clear from
independent sources that chronic malnutrition, polluted drinking water,
and untreated chronic diseases affect a significant percentage of the
Cuban population.
A Cuban Transition Government will need to do what the current regime
has never done: to put the needs of the people before the need to
maintain absolute control. The Cuban Transition Government will face
daunting challenges as it begins to address the basic human needs of the
Cuban people. The Cuban people will expect rapid and effective action.
In order to ensure the support of the public, the Cuban Transition
Government should quickly identify priority actions and mobilize
internal and external resources to sustain them. The Cuban Transition
Government will want to avoid the onset of a complex human disaster that
could be used as an excuse for those who might wish to restore the
repressive regime in Cuba.
Another matter that the Cuban Transition Government will want to address
is the likelihood, under any scenario, that internal migration could
become a problem. Large numbers of impoverished rural residents could
flood the cities where there is hope of increased income, relief
supplies, and Government services. Such a massive influx could result in
large numbers of "internally-displaced" people, squatting on public land
and erecting temporary shelters without adequate food, sanitation,
health care or potable water.
Non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and faith-based groups already play an integral role in providing
vital humanitarian assistance in Cuba. Their support to the Cuban people
at the time of transition, where they have established relationships and
information about the needs in these localities, will be essential to
the success of the Cuban Transition Government’s efforts to complete a
rapid and successful transition and hold free and fair multiparty
elections.
The U.S. Government stands ready to help the Cuban Transition Government
to avert humanitarian emergency in Cuba by assisting the Government in
addressing the immediate water, sanitation, health, food, shelter,
protection, and education needs of the Cuban people and working to bring
other international partners into the process of assistance. Assisting a
Cuban Transition Government to meet these basic needs is paramount for a
stable transition period, new Government credibility, and timely
elections.
Humanitarian assistance could include support in the following sectors:
(1) water and sanitation; (2) health systems and nutrition; (3) food
security; (4) shelter and settlements; (5) protection; and (6) education
services. This collective humanitarian support will help facilitate a
Cuban-led democratic transition.
Sovereign governments are responsible for the welfare of their own
citizens and for others in their care (e.g., refugees, asylum seekers,
migrants, etc.). U.S. Government assistance and that of the
international community should be provided to support, not substitute
for, the new Cuban Transition Government’s responsibility for its
people. The Transition Government should actively encourage and
contribute available resources (human and financial) for humanitarian
relief activities to reduce human suffering and prevent collapse.
Critical to a successful humanitarian response is the ability of all
parties to quickly, and preferably locally, access required resources
such as fuel, logistics and communications systems. Equally important in
the initial stages is U.S. Government and international support for
local Cuban media efforts. The public should have access to information
regarding the Cuban Transition Government’s humanitarian response
efforts to ensure the public is aware, understands, and remains
supportive of these activities.
Any U.S. Government assistance provided in response to requests by the
Cuban Transition Government would follow four principles: (1)
coordination with the Transition Government, international
organizations, bilateral donors, and international and existing Cuban
assistance organizations; (2) addressing the most critical humanitarian
needs; (3) identifying and prioritizing critical needs of vulnerable
populations first (e.g., women, children, elderly, disabled, displaced,
chronically-ill and chronically-underserved populations); and (4)
seeking to do no harm to individuals, households, the culture, the
economy, security, and the environment.
By providing assistance according to these principles, the U.S.
Government can help the Cuban Transition Government guarantee political
freedom, economic opportunity and hold free and fair multiparty
elections.
Water and Sanitation
Cuba today faces daunting water-supply and sanitation issues, including
inoperative sewage treatment plants. In the entire country, there are
only five municipal wastewater plants, and only four percent of the
sewage effluent has some degree of treatment. Water and sewer pipeline
networks are in shambles. Havana’s population of over two million people
uses a sewer system designed for a population of 600,000. Havana’s
wastewater flow receives primary treatment only, and excess flow is
discharged with minimal, if any, treatment.
Insufficient levels of wastewater treatment and the lack of sewer
pipelines have caused a degradation of water quality. Runoff from
heavily treated fields with fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides, as
well as the discharge of untreated effluents from cities and industries
such as sugar mills, sugar-by-products, food processing plants, and
mining operations, also severely pollute surface and groundwater in
Cuba. As a result, only 62 percent of Cubans have reasonable access to
disinfected water. Trash pickup is intermittently undertaken, which
perpetuates the proliferation of mini-dumpsites in populated areas and
near the perimeters of boarding schools and students/workers' camps.
There are also alarming difficulties in the hygienic conditions of
dumpsites and deficient handling and disposal of hazardous waste from
hospitals, which creates a serious health risk.
In light of these conditions, the Cuban Transition Government may
request U.S. Government and other donor support to prevent and control
the possible outbreak of sanitation-related infectious diseases in rural
and urban areas.
If requested, the U.S. Government could support efforts to ensure
critical water and sanitation services for the Cuban people. The U.S.
Government can work with the Cuban Transition Government, international
agencies, and other donors to: (1) ensure access to adequate quantity
and quality of potable water; (2) develop accessible human-waste and
wastewater disposal facilities; (3) ensure access to garbage/solid-waste
collection and disposal facilities; (4) assist local communities in the
planning and implementation of environmental-health interventions; (5)
help prevent sanitation-related disease; and (6) offer assistance to
local operations and management to improve the existing operation of
sanitation facilities.
Should the Cuban Transition Government request U.S. assistance to
address critical water and sanitation needs, the U.S. Government could
do the following:
Help address the needs for potable water and sanitation in major urban
and rural populations;
Provide chlorine or other water-treatment materials;
Assist with water trucks to deliver water to needy communities;
Provide technical assistance and other materials for the construction of
new wells in needy and vulnerable communities;
Assist with garbage trucks to collect and dispose of garbage in major
urban (or rural) areas, and in vulnerable population centers;
Provide soap, disinfectant, and cleaning materials to vulnerable groups;
Support infectious disease surveillance, especially in areas identified
to have an increased risk of disease outbreaks; and
Support hygiene-education programs in any sanitation-related
interventions, and provide technical assistance for mass-media
public-information campaigns health and sanitation.
Should the Cuban Transition Government request U.S. assistance once
critical needs have been addressed, the U.S. Government could provide
the following assistance during the recovery phase:
Help ensure sanitation
facilities are operational, adequately staffed and functioning;
Work with the Cuban Transition Government to ensure local communities
are actively involved in identifying and addressing their ongoing
critical needs, and in monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of
existing sanitation interventions; involve local and city governments to
develop and implement environmental-health education programs using
internationally recognized models such as Community Participation
Problem-Solving: The Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation
(PHAST) Approach or the Assessing Community Excellence in Environmental
Health (PACE-EH) approach promoted by the National Association of County
and City Health Officials (NACCHO); and
Work with the Transition Government to ensure national policies and
infrastructure increase the long-term capacity of local communities to
manage effectively the operation and maintenance of water and sanitation
facilities through training and technical support.
Health-Care and Nutrition
Despite one of the highest per capita rates of doctors in the world and
the ability to purchase medicines and medical devices from U.S.
companies and the rest of the international community for use in Cuban
hospitals, the Cuban health-care system lacks basic supplies and
equipment to treat the Cuban people on a daily basis. The regime has
chosen its priority: health spending on services and medicines for
foreigners, rather than its own citizens. Today, the regime is
increasingly sending its doctors abroad and diverting even more of its
medical resources to the treatment of foreigners in Cuba. In a form of
medical apartheid, hospitals that treat regime officials and foreigners
who pay hard currency have modern equipment, clean halls, and adequate
staffing, whereas hospitals that treat the average Cuban lack basic
medical supplies, such as bandages and over-the-counter painkillers,
have filthy hallways, insufficient lighting, and are understaffed.
Should a health or nutrition emergency arise when a Cuban transition
occurs, quick assistance could help the Cuban Transition Government
respond.
Potential U.S. Government responses to the array of possible needs
during a transition may be divided between actions necessary for
critical life-saving response and those available during a recovery
phase.
If requested, the U.S. Government working with United Nations (UN)
organizations, the international community, other donors, the U.S.
private sector, and other partners could provide critical health and
nutrition assistance in three major areas:
1) Preventing and Addressing Acute Malnutrition
School systems could provide nutritional supplements to children to
maintain an adequate diet until the new Government can stabilize its own
public-health and medical system;
The U.S. Government can support the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF), other partners, and health facilities to implement
supplementary feeding programs and community therapeutic-care programs
for the treatment of global acute malnutrition and severe acute
malnutrition;
The U.S. Government, in coordination with the UN (The Pan American
Health Organization (PAHO) and UNICEF) and others can assist local
health and local/decentralized Government facilities to provide primary
health care focus on preventing and treating killer diseases, such as
diarrhea, acute respiratory illness, and preventing the recurrence of
measles;
The U.S. Government could assist the Transition Government, UNICEF,
local health facilities, and other partners to conduct immunization
campaigns and vitamin A deficiency, assess quality control, and continue
of routine immunizations of all children and those under five not
already immunized; and
Assist local health and local/decentralized Government facilities to
rehabilitate key local health infrastructure for effective delivery of
care.
2) Ensure Supply of Drugs and Emergency Medical Commodities
Help ensure adequate supplies of health and
surgical kits are available;
Provide HIV/AIDS testing kits to verify access to a safe blood supply;
and
Utilize nutritional and health-assessment information to inform where to
direct acute and non-acute food, medical and surgical supplies and kits.
3) Detect and Respond to Immediate Health and Nutrition Needs
Conduct hands-on needs assessment to provide objective data and
observations on the state of health care, nutrition, and basic social
services; and
Conduct infectious-disease surveillance, and recommend actions for
assistance where water, sanitation, and health conditions are poor or
potentially harmful.
It will be crucial for the Cuban Transition Government to quickly
ascertain the health status or health care at the individual or
community level. Therefore, supporting a functioning health system,
preventing disease outbreaks, and other important health-care needs is
essential for a healthy population to aid the Cuba Transition Government
in guaranteeing political freedom, economic opportunity, and hold free
and fair elections.
If health and nutrition needs are limited or are under control, the U.S.
Government could assist a Cuban Transition Government and other partners
in recovery phase efforts in the following three priority areas, if
requested:
1) Support Surveillance Systems to Detect and Control Infectious
Diseases
Health and nutrition-surveillance systems monitor and help prevent
potential disease outbreaks. Assessments can reveal the capacity of
Cuban hospitals, clinics and physicians to identify and respond to
outbreaks of infectious diseases during a transition, and help create
surveillance systems appropriate for Cuban health and nutrition needs.
If Cuban health systems reveal weaknesses, the U.S. Government and
others could support local health and local/decentralized Government
facilities with the following actions, if necessary:
Conduct routine, sentinel, or survey surveillance of key infectious
diseases;
Respond to evidence of declining immunization coverage by delivering
immunizations throughout the country through campaigns or routine clinic
visits depending on, the state of health-facility and cold-chain
infrastructure; and
Revise and update existing national health emergency preparedness plans
to respond to the, potential spread of new infectious diseases, such as
pandemic influenza.
2) Meet the Ongoing Health Needs of Vulnerable Populations
If necessary, the U.S. Government could aid the Cuban Transition
Government in identifying possible gaps in health-care by providing
assistance to accomplish the following:
Improve the quality of epidemiological data-collection to determine
where needs exist for short-term actions, and help with the preparation
of long-term health-sector plans;
Assistance to help maintain the care of Cubans with chronic conditions;
and
Provide assistance to help re-staff health clinics that are understaffed
or are otherwise not functional.
3) Support Continued Functioning of the Cuban Health System
Ensuring that the Cuban health system is
operational and opened up to serve all Cubans is critical for the
welfare of the Cuban people. Assessments and surveillance systems can
reveal obstacles, gaps, or deterioration in health care. If issues are
identified and the Cuban Transition Government requests support, the
U.S. Government could support the Cubans and others to conduct the
following
Evaluate the quality and safety of basic health care, including
hospitals, health-care providers, elderly and nursing home care,
maternal, child health , referral networks, logistics, essential
drug-supply systems, and emergency transportation; and
Help Cuban health-care providers in assisting the Transition Government
to review health-related laws, regulations and policies to determine
changes necessary for sustaining and/or improving quality of health care
to maintain social protection, and, the proper monitoring and control of
infectious diseases.
Food Security
Mismanaged domestic agricultural production and a long-standing drought
have led Cuba to increasingly import food to meet basic nutritional
needs. Despite exports to Cuba from the United States of more than $1.2
billion in agricultural products between 2001 and 2006 and regular trade
with other countries, the Cuban government has failed to meet the basic
food needs of the Cuban people. The regime’s food-rationing system
provides Cubans with less than half of their monthly food needs. To meet
the shortfall, ordinary Cubans buy food on the black market or at
inflated prices in Government-run dollar stores, if they can secure the
funds. Government-run hotels that serve foreign tourists do not
experience similar shortages.
The Cuban population’s basic food needs must be addressed for the Cuban
Transition Government to create the conditions to fully guarantee
political freedom, economic opportunity, and hold free and fair
elections. Because acute food insecurity could have a negative impact on
the transition process, the U.S. Government should be prepared, if
requested, to work with other partners to help the Cuban Transition
Government address the needs of affected populations.
The regime’s own statistics from 2005 indicate that at least 15 percent
of Cuba’s population already is at severe nutritional risk. Any negative
shift in the capacity of the Cuban Transition Government to meet basic
food needs could result in instability and increased levels of
malnutrition. Under these circumstances, vulnerable populations are at
particular risk, and could require special consideration.
If requested, the U.S. Government can offer help in coordinating
food-security aid activities with the Cuban Transition Government, local
agencies, and civil society groups, to meet acute and recovery needs.
The U.S. Government could help the new Government alleviate food
insecurity by doing the following:
Improving the availability, access, and
utilization of food; and
Protecting the income and property of Cuban families by maintaining and
strengthening traditional strategies for coping with food shortages,
such as diversifying food sources and finding alternative income
opportunities.
If assessments reveal that malnutrition and food insecurity exist, the
critical emergency response must be rapid and effective. Upon request,
the U.S. Government could work with the Cuban Transition Government to
identify all available existing Cuban food-distribution systems and
decide which method would be the most effective to ensure the quick
delivery of food.
If requested in a recovery phase, the U.S. Government can support the
Transition Government, Cuban farmers, and Cuban agricultural industry
efforts to evaluate which systems are most effective for the medium and
long-term distribution of food or non-food related humanitarian aid, or
general commercial supplies, in the country.
If necessary and requested, the U.S. Government and other partners could
implement the following activities:
Assist local and general food distribution by the UN-World Food Program
(WFP) in accordance with internationally accepted standards to meet
daily caloric needs in response to critical malnutrition needs in
identified populations;
If necessary, establish Community Therapeutic Feeding Centers or
traditional Therapeutic Feeding Centers with local officials and
implementing partners to distribute supplemental foods to vulnerable
groups identified in nutritional assessments;
Identify short-term Food-for-Work activities for able-bodied Cubans in
local economic, environmental, or other immediate labor property to
assist a new Government in creating a secure and stable community; and
Identify and assess traditional coping mechanisms, including urban and
rural small home gardens to supplement emergency food needs.
The Cuban Transition Government may request support for Cuba’s
agricultural and livestock systems. If requested, the U.S. Government
could assist the Cuban Transition Government in implementing the
following activities to reduce the loss of productive assets, and
maintain and strengthen traditional crisis-coping mechanisms vital for
household food security:
Identify and coordinate with appropriate Transition Ministries, local
staff, communities, and organizations such as the UN Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) to implement critical agricultural and
livestock activities;
Support monitoring the affordability of food prices and suggest options
if prices rise above the capacity of most households to purchase food;
Encourage the continuation of agricultural production, and determine its
potential to meet emergency food needs for general and/or supplemental
food distribution or food markets;
Provide veterinary drugs and equipment, as needed, particularly
vaccinations for livestock to ensure the maintenance of any existing
protein sources for the population’s nutritional health;
Support efforts to secure
fuel, spare parts, and technical assistance to repair or to reestablish
the use of necessary agricultural machinery and equipment;
Identify and support local market channels for agricultural inputs and
livestock needs. If not locally available, explore moving supplies from
similar agricultural areas to places in need; and
Maintain food and economic access to contribute to the livelihoods of
vulnerable households via local seed fairs or other fairs that support
the diversification of livelihood options.
Once critical food insecurity and nutritional needs are stable, the U.S.
Government’s efforts can focus on assisting the Cuban Transition
Government and others to improve food security. If requested, the U.S.
Government could help the Cuban Transition Government work with local
authorities to evaluate and determine the best options to improve food
production and distribution systems. If requested, the U.S. Government
could assist Cubans to build local capability to assess and address the
following:
Food-distribution patterns -- markets, general distribution;
The availability of household income to meet additional food needs;
Status of vulnerable populations; and
Cuban-led efforts to strengthen local capacity to quickly identify and
manage urgent food needs.
If it is necessary to support agricultural and livestock systems in the
recovery phase, the U.S. Government and other partners could continue to
support the Cuban Transition Government’s efforts to assess household
coping mechanisms. Activities in the emergency phase could continue as
required by secondary assessments and regular monitoring. If requested
by the Cuban Transition Government, U.S. Government support could
include the following:
Support efforts to help agricultural production areas secure access to
agricultural system inputs such as identifying and providing locally
adapted and accepted seed varieties (from existing research and
educational institutions), organic fertilizer, tools (mechanization and
irrigation), and veterinary supplies;
Assist Cuban efforts to assess agricultural production methods that are
sustainable and contribute to meeting national and local food needs.
This can include assessing agricultural cooperatives, land access and
the removal of private market restrictions;
Support local veterinary and agriculture extension agents through the
provision of supplies or (if appropriate), through training and
capacity-building; and
Support local agricultural universities in the production and
multiplication of local preferred seed varieties (including preservation
of genetic resources), as well as improved local varieties of essential
food commodities.
Shelter
The Cuban government has allowed the island’s housing situation to fall
into severe crisis. U.S.-based housing experts have estimated Cuba is
lacking adequate housing by at least 1.6 million units. It is
commonplace for multiple families to inhabit inadequate two-room
structures or to "squat" in unsafe buildings. In light of additional
damage and structural collapses as a result of hurricanes, it is
unlikely that a complete resolution of Cuba’s severe housing crisis will
occur during a transition period.
Yet, should the Cuban Transition Government request U.S. Government
assistance in this area, U.S. Government actions can focus on supporting
a comprehensive assessment of Cuba’s housing needs and helping the Cuban
Transition Government provide temporary shelter to vulnerable
populations. Individuals without shelter are at increased risk of
exposure to unhealthy and unsafe conditions, such as infectious diseases
and risky behavior (including contributing to political instability).
Furthermore, if unable to find food and clean water, persons without
shelter can quickly become additional burdens on critical humanitarian
aid, which could jeopardize the ability of the Cuban Transition
Government to guarantee political freedom, economic opportunity, and
hold free and fair elections.
If requested, the U.S.
Government can assist the Cuban Transition Government and other partners
to conduct comprehensive assessments of shelter and settlement to ensure
shelter assistance: (1) is in accordance with the priorities of local
communities; (2) is supportive of the objectives of the Cuba Transition
Government; and (3) complies with recognized international humanitarian
shelter guidelines, such as those from the Sphere Project.
Rapid, critical assessments will reveal differences between social
(e.g., overcrowding) and structural (e.g., repair and upgrading) issues.
The U.S. Government can then base its support upon the provision of
safe, adequate, habitable, and hazard-resistant shelter to identified
vulnerable persons. U.S. Government aid can also promote "safer
settlements" to reduce the adverse impacts of natural hazards,
unhealthy, and unsafe conditions. The aforementioned includes providing
basic, shelter-related services (e.g., water, sanitation, drainage), and
providing garbage and/or solid-waste collection and disposal services to
identified vulnerable populations.
If requested, the U.S. Government, in coordination with other partners
and local communities, can help the Cuban Transition Government to
address critical shelter assistance needs as follows:
Provide safe, adequate, habitable, and hazard-resistant shelter; basic,
shelter-related services (e.g., water, sanitation, drainage); and
garbage and/or solid-waste collection and disposal services;
Work with communities in designing and implementing locally-developed
interventions providing for shelter;
Ensure all shelter and settlement interventions reflect
hazard-mitigation measures; and
Evaluate logistics-supply systems to ensure sufficient building supplies
are available for the timely construction of shelters, and are equitably
disbursed throughout the country.
Once critical shelter and settlement needs are addressed or are stable,
if requested, the U.S. Government can support the Cuban Transition
Government’s efforts regarding non-critical shelter and settlement
issues. If required, possible actions during the recovery phase could
include the following:
Continuing to work with local communities to ensure their participation
and voice in conducting on-site, on-going needs assessments to provide
an objective basis for determining the effectiveness of shelter
interventions;
Reviewing of national policy frameworks to identify any changes required
to ensure long-term local community involvement in the planning and
implementation of shelter and settlement interventions, and ensuring
programs receive sufficient financial and human resource support from
the Cuban Transition Government; and
Reviewing community-based hazard-mitigation and preparedness plans, and
supporting revisions if necessary to promote "safer settlements." These
plans could include structural (e.g., hurricane straps) and
non-structural interventions (e.g., coastal zone management, floodplain
management, hillside development ordinances, and local land-use
planning).
Protection of the Most Vulnerable Populations
"Protection" is a term applied to efforts to reduce physical, emotional,
and social risks to a population, particularly vulnerable individuals
and groups. A Cuban Transition Government will face immediate pressures
to provide equal access to basic services, and to promote the rights and
dignity of individuals, families, groups, and communities. If requested
to provide assistance, the U.S. Government should ensure incorporation
of internationally recognized protection principles into all assistance
initiatives for the Cuban people. These principles could guarantee
meeting the needs of the most vulnerable, while providing a potent
example of respect for the dignity of all people.
The U.S. Government could do this in several ways:
Incorporating protection into the design and implementation of
humanitarian assistance programs to identify and support vulnerable
populations to reduce or manage risks from violence, abuse, harassment,
and exploitation;
Assessing the needs of specific vulnerable populations, and considering
how to provide assistance to ensure their needs are met, including by
reinforcing positive coping mechanisms among individuals and
communities; and
Establishing information systems in the earliest stages of humanitarian
activities to share timely and accurate information with the population,
and between assistance providers.
If requested, the U.S. Government could support, along with other
partners, a Cuban Transition Government’s adherence to protection
principles, now and during critical and non-critical periods during the
transition as follows:
Ensuring protection principles are understood and adhered to by all
assistance sectors and organizations;
Assessing affected populations, with special attention paid to
identifying vulnerable individuals and groups and developing strategies
to reinforce positive coping mechanisms and ensure basic services meet
their needs;
Developing a monitoring and reporting system to ensure assistance
reaches vulnerable populations and to identify and resolve protection
problems;
Establishing a tracing system for separated families and supporting
reunification as soon as possible. The International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) could also provide useful assistance in this area;
Ensuring the safety of public records and other official documents,
including land-registry documents; and
Establishing a public-information system via radio, TV, and other means
to reach the broadest number of people.
Once critical protection needs are addressed, if requested, the U.S.
Government could support, with other partners, a Cuban Transition
Government’s efforts during the recovery phase to do the following:
Developing more robust
assessments, monitoring, and service-delivery to vulnerable populations;
Resolving family reunification cases; and
Providing individual identifications for those without, if necessary.
Educational Systems
Cuba’s educational system is based on the Soviet model of combining
education, physical labor, and political ideology to indoctrinate youth.
While Cuba reports one of Latin America’s best literacy rates,
children’s textbooks are ideologically skewed. Independent thought is
neither encouraged nor allowed. As part of their indoctrination,
adolescent students are sent away to poorly run work camps in the
countryside. Because of an exodus of seasoned educators to jobs in the
tourism industry, the Cuban educational system relies on
teachers-in-training, including 18-year-old high-school graduates.
Parents are increasingly expressing concern that these new teachers do
not have adequate training. As a result, the regime now prohibits
trained teachers from working in higher-paying, dollar-based jobs.
If requested, the U.S. Government could help the Cuban Transition
Government keep schools open, and help students, including vulnerable
individuals, remain in school during a transition.
The first step to meet this objective could be to conduct a field-based
needs assessment of the Cuban education system’s infrastructure,
staffing, funding, and materials, plus Cuban libraries, in cooperation
with Cuban Transition authorities. A preliminary assessment within the
first three months could form the basis for longer-term assistance
planning. This assessment should include facilities currently used for
instructional purposes at all levels, as well as facilities shut down or
converted by the regime that might be returned to educational uses.
If needed and requested by the Cuban Transition Government, U.S.
Government educational support, in coordination with other partners,
could include the following:
Assisting the Cuban Transition Government in finding options for
vulnerable populations if the transition creates problems of continuity
with basic services or economic hardship deprives individuals from
participating in education activities;
Organizing groups of volunteer teachers, from abroad and overseas Cuban
teacher associations, such as National Association of Cuban American
Educators to help support Cuban teachers; and
Engaging donors, including Organization of American States (OAS)
countries, and appropriate publishers to work with Cuban teachers to
supply temporary instructional materials to replace politicized
materials withdrawn by the Cuban Transition Government.
During a recovery period, if requested and necessary, the U.S.
Government could support the Cuban Transition Government’s efforts to
coordinate with international donors and assistance agencies, such as
religious bodies, private donors, civic groups, and the Cuban Transition
Government to do the following:
Ensure educational facilities and services are available to as many of
the Cuban people as possible; and
Assist the Cuban transition educational system to remove legal, social,
and health impediments to vulnerable populations who need special
consideration in either traditional educational systems or in
non-traditional education systems, such as those for current or released
prisoners, mentally ill individuals, the growing elderly population,
homeless youth, or drug abusers.
CHAPTER 3: HELPING CUBANS GET TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS
Introduction
A Cuban Transition Government will face the daunting challenge of ending
the brutal, one-party totalitarian state that has exercised complete
control over all aspects of life on the island and of organizing a
democratic process so that the Cuban people can reclaim their right to
determine their own future. The current regime manipulates migration and
uses violence and its absolute control of the Cuban economy to try to
forestall the emergence of a viable alternative to one-man rule. Despite
cruel repression, Cuba’s independent civil society and opposition remain
dedicated to securing liberty, meaningful change, and reconciliation for
Cuba’s 11 million citizens.
Cuba’s legitimate future can only be decided by Cubans, for Cubans. They
alone have the right to determine their own fate. Cubans have the right
to see their sovereign will expressed through free and fair, multiparty
elections. U.S. law provides that we can assist a transition government
only if it is committed to early elections. We cannot support a Cuban
government that does not allow its citizens to freely elect their
leaders. U.S. support will not be made available to a government that
adopts economic or other policies that suggest change but which do not
actually achieve the goal of dismantling the repressive regime and
making a full transition to democracy.
To meet international standards for free and fair elections, Cubans from
across the political spectrum would have to be able to enjoy
internationally recognized rights, including their right to organize
politically, to carry on an open and transparent debate through a free
press, to have a secret ballot, and to engage in voter education and
poll observation. They would also have to be free from intimidation in
the legitimate exercise of these rights.
The transition to such an open environment, sufficiently in advance of
elections to meet international standards, implies that a Cuban
Transition Government will need certain types of assistance from the
international community. U.S. preparations should be structured to
provide assistance bilaterally but should also focus on building
international consensus and assistance focused around supporting the
process of building democracy in Cuba.
The principal purpose of any
U.S. Government assistance should be to help Cubans create an
environment where free and fair elections can take place. Experience
demonstrates that the first six months of any assistance program are
critical. This 180-day period will surely also be critical to helping
Cubans secure a successful transition to democracy. Activities should be
properly sequenced to have better impact. This means that the U.S.
Government should be prepared well before a transition begins to be able
to respond in a timely manner. We cannot wait until a transition begins
to design assistance programs. We should do those things now and be
ready to implement our aid as soon as we are asked to do so.
A Cuban Transition Government cannot be expected to rectify, in a few
months, the consequences of decades of dictatorships. Accordingly, the
U.S. should encourage the Cuban Transition Government to focus on those
steps that will allow the election of a truly democratic, representative
government that can take on that historic challenge.
A Transition Government should not be overburdened with tasks that are
important to the medium and long term growth of Cuban society, but not
essential to elections for a democratic government. This will only delay
a real transition. Keeping these priorities straight will require real
discipline on the part of U.S. agencies and private institutions eager
to help the Cuban people.
U.S. assistance can be provided to help Cubans overcome obstacles to
democratic elections and move rapidly to create an environment conducive
to free and fair multiparty elections.
Release Of Political Prisoners
The release of political prisoners is a sine qua non for U.S. assistance
and an essential precondition for creating an environment in which
democratic elections may be held. It is not possible to create the
infrastructure of democracy if key political actors remain in prison and
unable to participate because of their political views.
Many Cuban prisoners of conscience are well known to the international
community. There are hundreds of others who are less well known.
U.S. policy makers will need the most accurate data possible to share
with a Cuban Transition Government concerning those who should be
released immediately to meet our criteria and international standards.
In addition, in compliance with international human rights standards,
the Cuban Transition Government should establish a process for Cuban
authorities to review claims of political incarceration, including cases |